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THE CONFORMING EFFECT: FIRST AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE, BEYOND
CHILLING SPEECH
Margot E. Karninski *
Shane Witnov **
"[Tihe threat of surveillance exerts a powerful influence over be-
havior, beliefs, and feelings, whether or not that threat is real-
ized."'
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual inquiry has long been a private activity, protected
by norms, laws, and physical constraints. Librarians have shield-
ed readers' records; states have passed reader privacy laws; and
printed books do not track your favorite passages unless you un-
derline them. But the advent of the search engine, public video
platforms, and the e-book have resulted in a drastic reduction in
the normative and structural constraints that once protected the
privacy of our intellectual endeavors.2
Several scholars have touted the importance of reader and
viewer privacy, explaining that legislation is necessary to protect
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. J.D., Yale
University; B.A., Harvard University.
** Practicing attorney in California. J.D., U.C. Berkeley School of Law; B.A., Stanford
University; M.S., Stanford University.
The authors wish to thank Chris Wolf of Hogan Lovells for workshopping a draft of
this paper at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference. Many thanks also go to Marc J. Blitz,
Yan Fang, Anne Klinefelter, Ron Lee, William McGeveran, Neil Richards, Lior Strahi-
levitz, and other participants at PLSC. Thank you also to Matthew Cushing, Mike Frank,
and Rachel Mackenzie.
1. Gregory L. White & Philip G. Zimbardo, The Effects of Threat of Surveillance and
Actual Surveillance on Expressed Opinions Toward Marijuana, 111 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 49,
59 (1980).
2. BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader Pri-
vacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2013); see Harry Surden,
Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1617 (2007).
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First Amendment values.' Courts and legislators are divided,
however, on the connections between privacy and free speech.
Some judges conclude that a lack of privacy causes First Amend-
ment chilling effects. Others evince skepticism over the effects of
surveillance, and suggest that chilling occurs only in response to
specific threats of retaliation. Similarly, legislators have recently
split on the value of protecting reader and viewer privacy. For ex-
ample, California enacted a new reader privacy law extending
protection to e-books, even as the federal government weakened
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 ("VPPA"), which protects
privacy in viewer records.4 And the federal government notorious-
ly passed section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, permitting those con-
ducting foreign intelligence investigations to obtain reader rec-
ords.'
These disagreements reflect vastly differing understandings of
the effects of surveillance on intellectual queries and intellectual
development. One side of the judicial debate believes that people
change their behavior in First Amendment-relevant ways only
when they fear retaliation. The other side intuits that chilling ef-
fects are more universal and occur even in the absence of specific
threats. However, both sides' justifications are based largely on
intuition and fail to cite empirical evidence for their claims. While
judges are by no means required or even expected to rely on social
science, social science can help clarify which of the intuited effects
of surveillance on First Amendment activity is supported by veri-
fiable observations.
This article brings First Amendment theory into conversation
with social science research. The studies surveyed here show that
3. See, e.g., Ard, supra note 2, at 3-4; Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safe-
guards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amend-
ment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799,
799-809 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copy-
right Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981-83 (1996); Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387-93 (2008).
4. See California Reader Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90 (Deering, LEXIS
through 2013 legislation). Compare Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(2006), with Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258,
126 Stat. 2414 (2013) (allowing viewers to consent to disclosure over a longer period of
time).
5. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (permitting the FBI to make "an application for an order
requiring the production of library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales rec-
ords, book customer lists").
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surveillance has certain effects that directly implicate the theo-
ries behind the First Amendment, beyond merely causing people
to stop speaking when they know they are being watched. Specifi-
cally, this article finds that social science research supports the
protection of reader and viewer privacy under many of the theo-
ries used to justify First Amendment protection.
If the First Amendment serves to foster a marketplace of ideas,
surveillance thwarts this purpose by preventing the development
of minority ideas. Research indicates that surveillance more
strongly affects those who do not yet hold strong views than those
who do.
If the First Amendment serves to encourage democratic self-
governance, surveillance thwarts this purpose as well. Surveil-
lance discourages individuals with unformed ideas from deviating
from majority political views. And if the First Amendment is in-
tended to allow the fullest development of the autonomous self,
surveillance interferes with autonomy. Surveillance encourages
individuals to follow what they think others expect of them and
conform to perceived norms instead of engaging in unhampered
self-development.
Thus, this article concludes that privacy in intellectual endeav-
ors is worth protecting through law, in the growing absence of
practical constraints.6 Judges who evaluate the surveillance of
readers and viewers should take into account the First Amend-
ment implications of surveillance, without requiring a specific
showing of retaliation. States should continue to enact privacy
statutes that protect intellectual inquiries. The contours of those
statutes would benefit from further research, and this article con-
cludes by pointing to several areas for future legal and empirical
study.
This article begins, in Part I, by examining reader and viewer
surveillance and identifying the forces driving its recent increase.
Part II considers how courts and legislatures understand this
surveillance, and how divisions in understandings of surveillance
drive divisions in legal approaches. Part III surveys the relevant
social science research on surveillance and conformity. Part IV
6. See generally Surden, supra note 2 (considering the interplay between privacy,
law, and societal norms as new technologies arise and circumvent traditional latent struc-
tural constraints).
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brings this social science into conversation with legal analysis,
identifying what it adds to the legal understanding of the "tyran-
ny of the majority." Part V considers how this fuller understand-
ing of the consequences of surveillance fits into First Amendment
theory. Part VI concludes with recommendations for courts and
legislatures and a call for further research.
I. WHAT DRIVES THE SURVEILLANCE OF READERS AND VIEWERS?
A changing technological and social environment has driven a
recent massive increase in the surveillance of readers, viewers,
and Internet browsers. Many different parties are interested in
peoples' reading habits. Amazon, book sellers, publishers, and in-
termediaries are all interested in what readers purchase so they
can better predict what consumers will want to buy next.' These
companies use data on readers to better sell books and to publish
more relevant books.' Even a third-party intermediary like Adobe
that does not sell or publish books tracks what users read on and
off of its platform.' Schools use data to track student engagement
in material and homework, potentially as part of their grade." E-
textbooks can even report on how much time students spend
reading." And, of course, advertisers for businesses of all types
use the content of webpages and web history to target viewers
with related advertising.12
Big Data companies track what people read so they can sell
other companies lists of consumers who buy certain products, in-
cluding romance novels or bibles and devotional books." Acxiom,
7. See Alexandra Alter, Your E-Book Is Reading You, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702 3 04870304 5 7 7 4 9 095005 14 3 830 4 .
8. Id.
9. Nate Hoffelder, Adobe is Spying on Users, Collecting Data on Their eBook Librar-
ies, DIGITAL READER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://the-digital-reader.com/2014/10/06/adobe-spying-
users-collecting-data-ebook-libraries/#.VGywHsk6qn
7
.
10. Marc Parry, Now E-Textbooks Can Report Back on Students'Reading Habits, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 8, 2012), http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/now-e-
textbooks-can-report-back-on-students-reading-habits/40928.
11. Id.
12. See Molly Wood, Sweeping Away a Search History, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014), http:
//www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/technology/personaltech/sweeping-away-a-search-history.
html?_r=O.
13. Epsilon TargetSource U.S.-Reading Preference, EPSILON, http://lists.epsilon.com/
market?page=research/datacard&id=352909 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (offering to sell
[Vol. 49:465468
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a data broker, claims to have data on 500 million consumers
worldwide, including over 500 predictions for nearly every U.S.
14consumer.
One extremely valuable piece of information for Big Data com-
panies and retailers is whether a consumer is undergoing a major
life change, such as getting married, having a child, buying a
house, or getting divorced, because spending habits are easier to
alter during these times." Not only is a consumer more likely to
be convinced to change brands or stores, but changes made dur-
ing major life events may last a lifetime.16 For example, Experian
sells lists of expectant parents and families with newborns."
Birth records are public, but knowing who is going to give birth
before it becomes public record is a huge competitive advantage."
Personal data on a pregnant person is worth about fifteen times
that of a non-pregnant person.
Reading habits can be a strong indication of impending life
changes. If a person starts buying books on raising children, she
may be expecting a child. If a person reads websites on divorce or
borrows a book on the subject from the library, she may be con-
templating a divorce. This information is valuable to marketers.
Advocacy groups have also sought reader information, either to
target those in opposition or to target potential supporters. In
1982, the Moral Majority sought the names of those who checked
email and mailing address information for $85 per thousand consumers based on reading
preference); Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About
You, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-
about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you.
14. AcXIOM, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2012), available at http://investors.acxiom.com/
secfiling.cfm?filingid=733269-12-15&cik=733269; see also Natasha Singer, You For Sale:
Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at BU1, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consum
er-database-marketing.html.
15. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012,
(Magazine), at 30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-
habits.html; Beckett, supra note 13.
16. Duhigg, supra note 15.
17. Beckett, supra note 13.
18. See Duhigg, supra note 15; Nathalia Holt, Bump Tracker: Nine Months of Big Da-
ta, ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/the-
bump-effect-nine-months-of-big-data/375820/.
19. Sarah Gray, One Woman's Attempt to Hide Her Pregnancy from Big Data-It's
More Difficult Than You'd Expect, SALON (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/
04/28/onewomansattempt ohide her.pregnancy-from big_datal.
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out a film on sexuality." More recently, the 2012 Obama presi-
dential campaign used detailed individual TV viewing records to
help win re-election." Viewer and reader habits can indicate who
is likely to support an organization, and who espouses views that
the organization might want to target.
The government has had a longstanding interest in reader da-
ta. In the 1970s, the FBI had a Library Awareness Program,
prompting a battle between law enforcement and librarians."
More recently, librarians fought the expansion of warrantless
government surveillance capabilities in the PATRIOT Act." Since
Edward Snowden's revelations, section 215 of the FISA Amend-
ments Act has become widely known as the statutory justification
for the dragnet surveillance of U.S. citizens' call records.24 But li-
brarians protested section 215 because it allowed the Director of
the FBI to apply for an order for the production of "tangible
things," which extends to library records.25
20. Film Borrowers' Names Sought by Moral Majority, ASSOC. PRESS (Feb. 8, 1981),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/08/us/around-the-nation-film-borrowers-nam
es-sought-by-moral-majority.html.
21. Jim Rutenberg, Data You Can Believe In, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, (Magazine),
at 22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/magazine/the-obama-campaigns-
digital-masterminds-cash-in.html. The campaign created a list of 15 million "persuadable"
voters in swing states. Id. The campaign targeted these voters in a variety of ways includ-
ing on TV. Id. To do this, the campaign bought a huge dataset of individual TV viewing
habits and matched this data with its fifteen million voters to create a database of the in-
dividualized viewing habits of the people the campaign was most interested in targeting,
which it used for making TV ad purchasing decisions. Id. Although the campaign "anony-
mized" the records, they were still making targeted decisions based upon viewing habits.
Id.
22. See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS: THE FBI's LIBRARY
AWARENESS PROGRAM 14, 54-71 (1991) (discussing the existence of the FBI's Library
Awareness Program and recounting various instances of confrontation between FBI
agents and librarians regarding the program).
23. June Kronholz, Patriot Act Riles an Unlikely Group: Nation's Librarians, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2003), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB106729549398054200; see also Joan
Airoldi, Case Study: A Grand Jury Subpoena in the PATRIOT Act Era, 20 LIBRARY
LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT 26, 26-27 (2006), available at https://journals.tdl.org/l1m/in
dex.php/l1m/article/view/1607/887.
24. Ellen Nakashima, Federal Appeals Court Hears Arguments over NSA's Bulk Col-
lection of Phone Records, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/federal-appeals-court-hears-arguments-over-nsas-bulk-collection-
of-phone-records/2014/09/02/cc75ef62-32df-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_story.html.
25. See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Renews Effort to Extend Expiring
PATRIOT Act Authorities, Increase Oversight (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.
leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-renews-effort-to-extend-expiring-patriot-act-authorities-incre
ase-oversight.
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The government's use of reader records goes beyond its fights
with libraries. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed
Monica Lewinsky's book purchase records from Kramerbooks and
Barnes & Noble as part of his investigation into the Clinton-
Lewinsky scandal.2 ' The FBI attempted to obtain the book pur-
chase records of former New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli
while investigating him for campaign finance abuses." The U.S.
Attorney subpoenaed Amazon for the used book purchase records
of over 24,000 people as part of an investigation into the possible
tax evasion and fraud perpetuated by a single person." Two years
earlier, law enforcement in Colorado sought the book purchase
records of a suspected drug manufacturer to prove the mens rea
element of a drug crime. In rural Washington, the FBI subpoe-
naed the names of everyone who checked out a biography of Osa-
ma Bin Laden after discovering a handwritten note in the margin
of the book quoting one of Bin Laden's public statements.o In
Ohio, law enforcement tried to subpoena the identities of every-
one in the greater Cleveland area who purchased two CDs "Cy-
borgasm I" and "Cyborgasm II" as part of a stalking investiga-
tion." Similarly, the Drug Enforcement Agency subpoenaed a
publisher for the identities of all Arizona residents who pur-
chased a book on how to grow marijuana.2 The IRS has asked or-
ganizations seeking nonprofit status about their reading lists."
26. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords Inc., 26 MED. L.
RPTR. 1599, 1599 (D.D.C. 1998).
27. Bob Tedeschi, The Patriot Act Has Led Online Buyers and Sellers to Watch What
They Do. Could It Threaten Internet Business?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2003), http://www.nyti
mes.com/2003/10/13/business/e-commerce-report-patriot-act-has-led-online-buyers-sellers-
watch-what-they.html.
28. Sealed Order at 1, In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com, No. 07-GJ-04
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://dig.csail.mit.edul2007/12/In-re-grand-jury-sub
poena-amazon.PDF; Ryan J. Foley, U.S. Withdraws Subpoena Seeking Identity of 24,000
Amazon Customers Sought as Witnesses, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 27, 2007.
29. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1061 (Colo. 2002).
30. Airoldi, supra note 23, at 26.
31. J. Michael Kennedy, To Bookseller, Officers' Try at a Search Warrants a Fight,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/27/news/v-methbook27.
32. Henry K. Lee, Dope on Pot Book Buyers Sought: DEA Subpoenas Publisher for List
of Manual Purchasers, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 29, 1997, at A19, available at http://www.sfgate.
cominews/article/Dope-on-Pot-Book-Sought-DEA-Subpoenas-2824507.php.
33. Abby D. Phillip, IRS Asks for Reading List, Tea Party Group Sends Constitution,
ABC NEWS (May 14, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/05/irs-asks-for-read
ing-list-tea-party-group -sends -constitution/.
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Police have used Internet viewing activity to help establish the
state of mind of a defendant."
Records of intellectual queries now encompass more than the
list of books a person reads. The documents that Edward Snow-
den released show that the government is engaged in broad data
collection, including tracking the Internet activities of most
Americans." The XKeyscore program is described as a tool to col-
lect "nearly everything a user does on the internet."" Former
long-time NSA employees have made similar characterizations
that the NSA was and is collecting extensive data on just about
everyone." This level of data collection is consistent with the
NSA's construction of a massive data center in Utah capable of
storing roughly a hundred years' worth of the world's communica-
tions." And, of course, other government agencies want to use
what the NSA collects."
What the government does with this mass of information is un-
clear. Documents that Snowden released suggest that the NSA
has monitored pornography viewing habits of suspected radicaliz-
ers as a deliberate means of potentially harming their reputa-
tions.40 It is also likely that the information is data-mined to re-
34. See Eliott C. McLaughlin & Dana Ford, Police: Father Was 'Sexting' as Son Was
Dying in Hot Car, CNN (July 4, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/03/justicelgeorgia-hot-
car-toddler-death/.
35. See generally The NSA Files, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
the-nsa-files (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (summarizing everything that is known to date
about the NSA's monitoring programs).
36. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects 'Nearly Everything a User Does
on the Internet, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/
nsa-top-secret-program-online-data.
37. Interview by Judy Woodruff with William Binney and Russell Tice, former NSA
analysts, for PBS Newshour (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ex-nsa-
analysts/.
38. Id. at 5:17; see also James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country's Biggest
Spy Center (Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://www.wired.
com/2012/03/ff nsadatacenter/all.
39. Eric Lichtblau & Michael S. Schmidt, Other Agencies Clamor for Data N.S.A.
Compiles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, at Al ("Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
cyber attacks, money laundering, counterfeiting and even copyright infringement com-
plain that their attempts to exploit the security agency's vast resources have often been
turned down because their own investigations are not considered a high enough priority,
current and former government officials say.")
40. See Glenn Greenwald, Ryan Gallagher & Ryan Grim, Top-Secret Document Re-
veals NSA Spied on Porn Habits as Part of Plan to Discredit 'Radicalizers, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims-n_43
46128.html.
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veal patterns about reader interests and behavior. One of the
documents that Snowden released suggests that the government
identifies targets by looking for anomalous Internet activity like
"searching the web for suspicious stuff."4 1
Readers, however, continue to expect and value their privacy
even in the face of widespread monitoring.42 In 2012, Fifty Shades
of Grey, a kinky romance novel, became a best-seller." One reason
for its stunning success was the widespread adoption of e-readers,
which allowed people to read the book without anyone around
them knowing what they were reading.4 4 A person reading an e-
book also did not have to interact with anyone to buy the book."
It was only after the book became a widely discussed phenomenon
that more people felt comfortable buying the physical book and
being seen with it." A Saturday Night Live skit spoofed the phe-
nomenon in a fake Amazon commercial.4 7 The ad showed well-
meaning fathers and children rushing into bedrooms, bathrooms,
and living rooms with surprise Mother's Day gifts for their wives
41. NSA, XKeyscore, PowerPoint Presentation, Feb. 25, 2008, slide 15, in XKeyscore
Presentation from 2008, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/in
teractive/2013/jul/3 1/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation.
42. See, e.g., Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW
RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/an
onymity-privacy-and-security-online/ (finding "86% of internet users have taken steps
online to remove or mask their digital footprints" and "55% of internet users have taken
steps to avoid observation by specific people, organizations, or the government").
43. See Best Sellers: Paperback Trade Fiction, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2012-03-25/trade-fiction-paperback/list.html.
44. Noah Berlatsky, Porn on the Kindle: A Catch-22, ATLANTIC (July 24, 2013), http://
www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/07/porn-on-the-kindle-a-catch-22/278075/; Eman-
uella Grinberg, Explaining 'Fifty Shades' Wild Success, CNN (July 17, 2012), http://www.
cnn.com/2012/07/13/living/fifty-shades-buzz-50-shades-success/index.html ("E-books have
also helped to ease the transition by offering newcomers to the genre a way to read in vir-
tual anonymity."); Frederic Happe, Ebooks Enhance Erotic Literature Sales, INQUIRER.NET
(Oct. 14, 2012), http://technology.inquirer.net/18934/ebooks-enhance-erotic-literature-sales
("With no cover on display, an ereading device such as a Kindle makes the literature
anonymous to the outside world.").
45. Berlatsky, supra note 44; Happe, supra note 44.
46. The book first made the New York Times Best Seller List as an e-book and only
later became a best-selling physical book. Compare Best Sellers: E-Book Fiction, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2012-03-04/e-book-fiction
/list.html, with Best Sellers: Paperback Trade Fiction, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2012), http:
//www.nytimes.comlbest-sellers-books/2012-03-25/trade-fiction-paperback/ist.html.
47. Saturday Night Live: Amazon Mother's Day Ad (NBC television broadcast May 5,
2012), available at http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/amazon-mothers-day-ad/
n13488.
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and mothers." To everyone's surprise, the families discovered the
mothers in compromising positions reading Fifty Shades of Grey.
The ad ended with the suggestion that what Mom really wanted
for Mother's Day was a Kindle, so no one would know what she
was reading.o
Although giving Mom a Kindle may provide her privacy from
her prying family or passengers on the bus, Amazon knows what
page she is on and how many times she has re-read it."' The suc-
cess of the Fifty Shades of Grey e-book suggests either that read-
ers did not know Amazon was following their reading, or that
they did not care, or perhaps that the book would have sold even
better with improved privacy protections.
Several studies suggest that Americans have changed their
online habits in response to Snowden's revelations." The percent-
age of Internet users worried about online privacy increased 19%
between June and July of 2013, during the seven weeks after the
first Snowden story ran in The Washington Post and The Guardi-
an." The percentage of users who adjusted browser privacy set-
tings grew in that same period by 16%, and users reported editing
social media profiles and blocking cookies in their Internet
browsers."
In November 2013, PEN America released a study of over 500
writers, which indicated that many writers engage in self-
censorship because of concerns over surveillance." Twenty-eight
percent had curtailed social media activities while 24% had delib-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Alter, supra note 7.
52. ANNALECT, ANNALECT Q2 2013 ONLINE CONSUMER PRIVACY STUDY: AMERICANS'
CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRIVACY OF ONLINE INFORMATION JUMP IN THE WAKE OF NSA
DISCLOSURES 2-3 (2013), http://www.annalect.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Annalect
ConsumerOnlineStudyQ2_2013.pdf; see also THE FDR GROUP & PEN AMERICAN CTR.,
CHILLING EFFECTS: NSA SURVEILLANCE DRIVES U.S. WRITERS TO SELF-CENSOR 3-4 (Nov.
12, 2013) [hereinafter THE FDR GROUP], available at http://www.pen.org/sites/default
/files/Chilling/o20Effects PEN%20American.pdf (discussing a survey that shows writers'
self-censorship online as a result of Snowden's study of NSA surveillance).
53. ANNALECT, supra note 52, at 3.
54. Id. at 2-3.
55. THE FDR GROUP, supra note 52, at 3; see also WILLIAM H. DUTTON ET AL., WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, THE INTERNET TRUST BUBBLE: GLOBAL VALUES, BELIEFS AND
PRACTICES 10 (2013), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFInternetTrustBub
bleReport2_2014.pdf.
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erately avoided certain topics in phone and email conversations."
A 2012 survey conducted before the Snowden revelations also
showed significant global concern over online surveillance activi-
ties, with 63% of users concerned about government monitoring
and 71% saying they are careful about what they do or say
online." Only 54% responded that the Internet is a safe place to
express opinions."
II. WHERE COURTS AND LEGISLATURES HAVE DIVIDED
As technologies that enable others to glean fine-grained infor-
mation about readers' habits have spread, a number of legal
scholars have articulated First Amendment foundations for a
right to reader or viewer privacy grounded in Supreme Court ju-
risprudence.5 ' First Amendment privacy has been termed freedom
of thought, intellectual privacy, and "freedom of intimate self-
definition."" It has also been justified as part of the more general
First Amendment right to receive information.6 1
Legal scholars have found that the First Amendment supports
privacy protection in a number of ways. The first is through the
protection of the First Amendment right to receive information."
Several cases point to a right to receive information in private."
However, the scope of the jurisprudence is limited in several
ways. First, the Court has generally recognized First Amendment
56. THE FDR GROUP, supra note 52, at 3.
57. DUTTON ET AL., supra note 55, at 10, 13.
58. Id. at 10.
59. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 1012 (noting that the "material conditions for non-
anonymous reading ... have only recently come to exist"); see also Blitz, supra note 3, at
876 (noting that the First Amendment provides a right to receive that allows individuals
to exercise their freedoms "without saying a word about what they believe"); Richards, su-
pra note 3, at 412 (noting that the Supreme Court has called freedom of thought a founda-
tion of the First Amendment and of a free society).
60. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Pri-
vacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12, 69-71 (1991); Rich-
ards, supra note 3, at 416-17.
61. See Blitz, supra note 3, at 800; Cohen, supra note 3, at 1015.
62. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 1015.
63. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (observing that it is "now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas");
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (finding registration require-
ments for receipt of communist mail to be unconstitutional); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 146, 149 (1943) (holding that banning door-to-door distribution of circulars interfered
with the listeners' right to receive information).
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privacy only when the government has affirmatively required a
person to do something, such as put a name on a handbill, reveal
a membership list, or register before door-to-door petitioning.64 In
this way, jurisprudence on First Amendment privacy resembles
jurisprudence on compelled speech: the government cannot com-
pel a person to identify herself. It is not clear whether these pro-
tections extend to circumstances where no affirmative act is re-
quired, and several cases suggest they might not."
Second, there is a divide between Justices and between courts
of appeals over whether a person must show that she has sus-
tained or is likely to sustain injury in order to benefit from First
Amendment privacy protection." This split is likely grounded in
differing empirical assumptions about the effects of surveillance
on First Amendment activity, and can be informed by referring to
social science.
Scholarly support for First Amendment privacy has been
strong. Seth Kreimer has articulated the notion of a freedom of
intimate self-definition, explaining that privacy allows a person
to experiment with different identities and escape public pressure
to conform." Julie Cohen has identified that readers have been
neglected in First Amendment theory, and conceives of reader
privacy as a protection for the right to receive, which is a neces-
sary complement to the right to speak.'" Marc J. Blitz has focused
on the importance in a free society of providing citizens with in-
stitutions, such as libraries, that can provide an escape from so-
cial pressures and allow for experiments in ideological for-
mation." Blitz's philosophical approach builds on ideas articu-
lated in John Stuart Mill's Essay on Liberty.70
64. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 167-69 (2002); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 355-57 (1995);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1958).
65. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (finding no standing where complainant
alleged that exercise of First Amendment rights was "being chilled by the mere exist-
ence . . . of a government investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be
broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid govern-
ment purpose").
66. See id. at 13 (citing Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
67. See Kreimer, supra note 60, at 69-71 (noting that "[tlhe citizen who is truly free in
forming her identity should have the opportunity to experiment with roles she does not
wish to adopt in public").
68. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 1015.
69. Blitz, supra note 3, at 820, 879.
70. Id. at 818-20.
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Neil Richards situates reader privacy within a larger concept of
"intellectual privacy," which protects records of intellectual activi-
ties and includes not only the protection of readers, but also the
protection of spatial privacy, confidential communications, and
other related areas." More recently, several scholars have written
about the contours of statutory protection for reader and viewer
privacy.72
These scholars are correct that Supreme Court First Amend-
ment jurisprudence supports some sort of First Amendment right
to privacy. They are also correct in recognizing that there are sig-
nificant doctrinal limitations to that right.7 ' The First Amend-
ment right to privacy is a real, but tenuous, thing. This article
does not aim to posit a doctrinal resolution, but rather to identify
the splits in the doctrine to explain why a reference to social sci-
ence can be helpful in this space.
The Supreme Court has, in a number of cases, used language
that should lead to sweeping support for reader privacy protec-
tion. The Court has indicated that reader privacy is protected as
part of the penumbra of First Amendment rights necessary for
foundational rights to be properly protected. 74 The First Amend-
ment protects not only speech, but "the right to distribute, the
right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom
of thought, and freedom to teach.. . . Without those peripheral
rights the specific rights would be less secure."7 ' As part of the
71. Richards, supra note 3, at 408.
72. See generally Ard, supra note 2 (noting that overcoming reader confidentiality
problems requires that protective obligations are defined by the content that needs protec-
tion rather than the actors who may possess it); Margot Kaminski, Reading over Your
Shoulder: Social Readers and Privacy Law, 2 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012),
available at http://www.wakeforestlawreview.con/2012/03/reading-over-your-shoulder-soc
ial-readers-and-privacy-law/# (explaining that a prevalent battle in privacy law concerns
the right to consume content without a third party having access to that activity); Bruce
M. Kennedy, Confidentiality of Library Records: A Survey of Problems, Policies, and Laws,
81 LAw LIBR. J. 733 (1989) (analyzing government use of individuals' library records to
enhance law enforcement, public safety, and national security, and to spy on lawful re-
search activity); William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15 (2013)
(proposing a solution to the "friction" that keeps individuals from disclosing personal in-
formation on online).
73. Richards, for example, calls intellectual privacy a First Amendment value, recog-
nizing that First Amendment doctrine may not require it. Richards, supra note 3, at 428-
29.
74. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
75. Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted).
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protection of necessary conditions for speech, "the First Amend-
ment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from govern-
mental intrusion."
The Court has also reasoned that reader privacy is based on
the overlapping of two distinct rights: the right to receive infor-
mation and the right to privacy. Individuals have a "right to re-
ceive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth."
They also have "the right to be free, except in very limited cir-
cumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy.""
The right to receive information in private is part of a more
general right to be left alone by government. Justice Louis
Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, reasoned
about privacy in terms of restricting government power."o Justice
Brandeis famously characterized privacy as the "right to be let
alone" by government."
The most frequent line of Supreme Court reasoning as to why
the First Amendment protects privacy rests on a concern that
people will be deterred from speaking-that is, that people will
experience "chilling effects."" Without privacy, a person will be
deterred from exercising her right to receive information, or her
right of association, or her right of distribution. For example,
when the government required addressees to affirmatively re-
quest communist literature, the Supreme Court was concerned
that this affirmative obligation to contact the government would
have "a deterrent effect, especially as respects those who have
sensitive positions."" The Court recognized that "any addressee is
likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which fed-
eral officials have condemned."84 The Court has elsewhere recog-
nized that "identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfect-
76. Id. at 483.
77. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 277 U.S. 438, 474-76, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 478.
82. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 112, 142-43 (2007).
83. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
84. Id.
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ly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance."" Laws
that deter discussion by creating a fear of reprisal violate the
First Amendment.
In recent cases, members of the Court have appeared to recog-
nize First Amendment implications of digital surveillance in the
context of Fourth Amendment challenges. Justice Sonia So-
tomayor, in her concurrence in the GPS surveillance case United
States v. Jones, noted that "[a]wareness that the Government
may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.""
Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority in the cell
phone search-incident-to-arrest case Riley v. California, cited
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence and noted that "[a]n Internet
search and browsing history . .. could reveal an individual's pri-
vate interests or concerns-perhaps a search for certain symp-
toms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.""
But when the Court recently faced First and Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to mass surveillance in Clapper v. Amnesty In-
ternational, it rejected the case for lack of standing." This and
other jurisprudential trends indicate that reader privacy has
more tenuous doctrinal support than the Supreme Court's reason-
ing and dicta might suggest. Neil Richards and others have con-
sequently referred to reader privacy as a First Amendment val-
ue-a concept articulated by Jack Balkin to describe the values
necessary for First Amendment rights, but not fully enshrined in
First Amendment doctrine."
The first prong of skepticism in the doctrine is over whether
surveillance by itself constitutes an injury in the First Amend-
ment space. As noted above, most of the First Amendment priva-
cy cases concern an affirmative requirement that the recipient of
information identify herself or otherwise be revealed: a request to
85. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
86. See id.; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
87. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. _, , 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
88. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _, -, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
89. 568 U.S. -, -, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
90. Richards, supra note 3, at 416-19, 428-29; Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and
Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 50-52 (2004) ("Free speech rights are rights of individuals enforceable by
courts. Free speech values are values that we seek to promote through legislative and ad-
ministrative regulation and through technological design.").
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receive mail, the revelation of membership lists, or a signature on
a handbill.91 When the Court in Laird v. Tatum faced a challenge
to widespread government surveillance that lacked an affirmative
requirement of action, the five-judge majority found that allega-
tions of a subjective chill due to overbroad government surveil-
lance did not constitute a cognizable injury for purposes of stand-
ing." The majority distinguished the broad government
surveillance in Laird from the "affirmative obligation" that re-
ceivers of communist mail identify themselves in Lamont v.
Postmaster General."
Laird is a decision about standing, but it shows the majority's
skepticism about the harms of surveillance, especially where "the
information gathered is nothing more than a good newspaper re-
porter would be able to gather."" In the more recent Clapper case,
the Court again rejected First Amendment challenges to mass
surveillance for lack of standing." In Clapper, the Court hinged
its finding of a lack of standing on the fact that challengers could
not show they had been targeted and surveilled.9 6 The Court cited
Laird for the proposition that fear of surveillance alone is insuffi-
cient to create standing." A plaintiff has to show a "certainly im-
pending" threatened injury, traceable to the challenged law.98
Justice Stephen Breyer, in his dissent, pointed out that the com-
munications at issue were private telephone and email conversa-
tions, unlike the public communications in Laird." This distinc-
tion between publicly accessible and private information may
make a difference when the programs that Snowden revealed end
up back in front of courts.
The second point of frailty in the doctrinal support for First
Amendment privacy rests in the question of whether challengers
91. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
92. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
93. Id. at 12 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965)).
94. Id. at 9 (quoting Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
95. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. , , 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013).
96. Id. at 1147-50 (stating that threatened injury must be "certainly impending" and
traceable to the law challenged).
97. Id. at 1152 (citing Laird, 408 U.S. at 10-15).
98. Id. at 1143 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
99. Compare id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that telephone and
email communications were at issue), with Laird, 408 U.S. at 2, 6 (considering the Army's
data-gathering system which utilized principle sources such as news media and publica-
tions in general circulation).
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must show that they have been subject to specific threats of retal-
iation for their viewpoints. Some judges have found that the First
Amendment protects privacy only when the plaintiff can show a
colorable fear of reprisal that will prevent her from speaking or
seeking information."oo Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting in
McIntyre v. Ohio, a case about anonymous speech, interpreted the
Court's jurisprudence as recognizing a right to anonymity only for
"someone who could show a 'reasonable probability' that the com-
pelled disclosure would result in 'threats, harassment, or repris-
als from either Government officials or private parties."'01 While
the majority in McIntyre did not require a showing of possible re-
prisals to overturn the government's identification requirement
for political handbills, Justice Scalia noted that reprisal showings
might be required in other circumstances.102
Examining other Supreme Court cases shows that Justice Scal-
ia's reprisal requirement does have doctrinal foundations. In
NAACP v. Alabama, a dispute over whether Alabama could re-
quire the NAACP to reveal its membership lists, the Court noted
that the petitioner had "made an uncontroverted showing that on
past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file mem-
bers has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of em-
ployment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility."0 ' The Court found that "the crucial factor is the
interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after
the initial exertion of state power represented by the production
order that private action takes hold."04 This language could be
read to mean that the NAACP received First Amendment protec-
tion because it could show private threats of reprisals against its
members. Similarly, in Talley v. California, a challenge to a re-
quirement that persons print their names on handbills, the Court
reasoned that laws that deter discussion by creating a fear of re-
100. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96, 504-506 (1977);
Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 841 (N.D. Ind.
1999).
101. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam)).
102. Id. at 355-57; id. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74
(per curiam)).
103. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
104. Id. at 463.
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prisal violate the First Amendment.o' Both NAACP and Talley
came before McIntyre, however, so McIntyre appears to control.0 6
In the more recent case of Doe v. Reed, a challenge to the dis-
closure of the signatories of referendum petitions, the majority of
the Court appeared to adopt Justice Scalia's requirement of a
showing of reprisals." The majority found that plaintiffs had
failed to show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclo-
sure . . . will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals
from either Government officials or private parties.""os However,
the majority several times emphasized that Doe v. Reed occurred
in the context of election law, and thus there is no indication that
the Court intended to replace its analysis in McIntyre.'s
Lower courts have split over whether plaintiffs must show that
they have been or will be subject to threats or reprisals to obtain
protection of their First Amendment privacy."10 Several courts do
not require a showing of reprisals, instead assuming that chilling
effects will occur."' However, others require, or at least
acknowledge, a record before them showing specific evidence of
threatened or likely reprisals."2
This judicial skepticism about the extent of chilling effects
points to empirical assumptions about the effects of surveillance.
The above cases indicate that at least some members of the judi-
ciary believe surveillance in itself is not harmful, and that chills
occur only when people have a fear of something beyond surveil-
lance."3 Social science can play an important role in informing
this understanding.
105. See 362 U.S. 60, 60, 65 (1960).
106. See supra notes 101, 103, 105, noting the date of each respective decision.
107. 561 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010). Chief Justice Roberts pointed out
that the lowered standard of exacting scrutiny applies in the electoral context. Id.
108. Id. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976)).
109. Id. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 2818-19, 2821.
110. Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case
Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 875
(2013).
111. See, e.g., Ghafari v. Municipal Court for the City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 150
Cal. Rptr. 813, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
112. See, e.g., Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835,
841 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (acknowledging the record of retaliation as an important factor in
concluding a city ordinance restricted the group's freedom of expression).
113. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
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Legislators appear similarly split over the harms of surveil-
lance in the reader and viewer context. While California enacted
a statute protecting digital reader privacy in 2012, the federal
government revised the VPPA to reduce statutory protections for
viewers at the federal level."4 Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act al-
so underplays First Amendment concerns, giving the government
access to reader records even while clarifying that individuals
cannot be targeted solely based on First Amendment rights.1"
Legislatures could similarly stand to be informed by social science
research in this space.
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE ON SURVEILLANCE AND CONFORMITY
The traditional story of chilling effects is that individuals make
a conscious decision to self-censor in order to avoid some per-
ceived or explicit consequence."' Social psychology research into
conformity and decision-making suggests a more complicated and
widespread chill that subtly affects many people, even without
their awareness of its influence. There may well be a chilling ef-
fect on speech; however, a conforming effect is likely the more
pernicious element at play.
Social psychology has shown that: (1) people are strongly influ-
enced by group behavior;"' (2) this influence can have long-
lasting effects on opinion, perceptions, and beliefs;"' (3) even the
suggestion of observation can reinforce a group's influence;"' and
(4) people being influenced may not realize that they have been
influenced. 2 '
114. See Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258,
126 Stat. 2414 (2013); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90 (Deering, LEXIS through 2013 legisla-
tion).
115. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012).
116. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1633, 1652-53 (2013).
117. See, e.g., Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity
and Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245, 245 (2005).
118. See, e.g., J.H. Rohrer et al., The Stability of Autokinetic Judgments, 49 J. ABNORM.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 595, 597 (1954).
119. See, e.g., Aaron M. Watson et al., When Big Brother Is Watching: Goal Orientation
Shapes Reactions to Electronic Monitoring During Online Training, 98 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 642, 643-44, 650 (2013).
120. See Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distor-
tion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951), re-
2015] 483
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Widespread surveillance is likely to subtly increase the majori-
ty's influence such that, in some situations, people will decide not
to read a given book or article or explore a new topic. This con-
forming effect need not be based on direct threats or even aware-
ness by a given individual that she has been influenced.
While the chilling effect plays an enormous role in First
Amendment doctrine, its empirical basis has been questioned by
scholars.12 ' Leslie Kendrick has discussed the chilling effects doc-
trine in its more traditional context: overbroad laws.'2 2 Kendrick
has pointed out the practical impossibility of designing experi-
ments to determine the effect of overbroad laws on speakers.12 3
She writes that "[i]t is difficult to establish either the presence or
the absence of a chilling effect."'24 Analysis of the chilling effect in
doctrine is an example of one of the "dilemma[s] of ignorance"
identified by Frederick Schauer in which judges have to decide in
a space where they may never be practically informed.'
Although much more research into the societal effects of sur-
veillance should be conducted, existing studies suggest that sur-
veillance causes conforming and other potential harms to First
Amendment values. There need not be a dilemma of ignorance
with respect to surveillance's effects on First Amendment values.
Empirical research shows that privacy may be important for the
development of new ideas, for challenges to the status quo, for
change, and for a vigorous democracy.
That said, none of the studies outlined here were designed to
specifically test the consequences of surveillance of media con-
sumption on intellectual development. In light of Edward Snow-
den's disclosures revealing significant surveillance by the United
States and other governments, and increased public awareness of
government and commercial surveillance, additional studies on
printed in DOCUMENTS OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY 222, 223-28 (Mary Henle ed., 1961)
[hereinafter Asch 1951].
121. See Kendrick, supra note 116, at 1637-38; Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 688-89 (1978).
122. See Kendrick, supra note 116, at 1653.
123. Id. at 1675-83.
124. Id. at 1675.
125. Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin,
2001 S. CT. REV. 267, 268-69 (2001).
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the effects of surveillance are essential to understanding the soci-
etal costs of such programs.
The following sections first examine studies that provide a
background on conforming behavior. Second, they consider relat-
ed studies, which suggest that the effects of widespread surveil-
lance go beyond chilling effects. Finally, in light of the various
First Amendment theories, these studies provide support for
stronger privacy protections.
A more thorough understanding of basic social psychology will
help judges and legislatures better understand the possible con-
sequences of widespread surveillance. One of the basic lessons of
social psychology is that people have a tendency to change their
behavior to conform to group norms."' One psychology scholar
summarized this point: "[I]ndividuals assume and are motivated
to assume that the majority is correct.""' The conforming effect
can be so strong that people will deny their own perceptions.128
Understanding the conforming effect is important because sur-
veillance is likely to encourage conformity with group norms,
which has costs under any theory of the First Amendment.
A. Foundational Experiments on Conformity
Two seminal studies on conformity were conducted by Muzafer
Sherif in the 1930s and Solomon Asch in the 1950s.'2 9 Both stud-
ies found that individuals are highly susceptible to being influ-
enced by groups.'
In Sherifs study, subjects were put in a dark room with a sin-
gle small point of light on a wall and asked how much the point of
126. SAUL KASSIN, STEVEN FEIN & HAZEL ROSE MARKUS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 224 (7th
ed. 2008) (stating that individuals alter their "perceptions, opinions, and behavior in ways
that are consistent with group norms").
127. Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority In-
fluence, 93 PSCYHOL. REV. 23, 25 (1986).
128. See DANIEL T. GILBERT, SUSAN T. FISKE & GARDNER LINDZEY, THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 166 (4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998); Morton Deutsch & Harold B.
Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual
Judgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 635 (1955).
129. MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936); Asch 1951, supra
note 120. For a summary of both experiments see KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note
126, at 224-26.
130. KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note 126, at 226.
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light moved."' Although the light never moved, individuals gen-
erally claimed there was some amount of movement.3"' Over suc-
cessive rounds of the experiment, a given individual usually set-
tled on reporting that the light moved about the same amount.'3 3
After reporting individually, the subjects were again run
through the same experiment-except this time, they observed
the light and reported the amount of movement out loud in a
group of three people.14 Over three rounds of group observations
and reporting with the same group of people, the individual sub-
ject's statement of how much the light moved converged towards
the same response for everyone in the group, showing conformity
to the norm that developed in that particular group.'"' Sherif
found about a 70% conformity rate.3 6
In Asch's experiment, subjects were asked to judge the length
of a line relative to three possible matches, where the correct an-
swer was obvious.'17 The participants gave their answers out loud,
one-at-a-time, in a group." However, all but one of the "subjects"
were confederates of the experimenter."' After a couple of une-
ventful rounds, the confederates started selecting the same obvi-
ously incorrect option.40 The subjects in the study would conform
to the obviously incorrect judgment of the rest of the group 37% of
the time.14 ' Later researchers conducting similar experiments ex-
plained that the results were "not particularly optimistic for those
131. Id. at 224.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. SHERIF, supra note 129, at 104; see KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note 126, at
224-25.
136. KENNETH S. BORDENS & IRWIN A. HOROWITZ, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 245 (2d ed.
2002).
137. Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31, 33 (1955) [here-
inafter Asch 1955]. In the control group, individuals gave the incorrect response less than
1% of the time. Id. at 33-34.
138. Id. at 33.
139. Id. In successive experiments, the number of confederates varied, but the results
did not significantly vary for any number of confederates above three. See Asch 1951, su-
pra note 120, at 233.
140. Asch 1955, supra note 137, at 33.
141. Id. at 33-34.
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who place a high value on the ability of an individual to resist
group pressures which run counter to his individual judgment."
B. Types of Conformity
Social psychologists recognize two main types of conforming in-
fluences: informational influences and normative influences."4 In-
formational influences cause people to conform because they ac-
cept information from others as evidence about reality.114 This
influence is especially strong in situations where people engage in
difficult or ambiguous tasks.'4 ' Discussion and the sharing of ar-
guments and factual information are types of informational influ-
ences.'46 Normative influences cause people to conform because
they want to avoid the negative social consequences of appearing
deviant.'47 This effect is particularly strong when the majority is
unanimous.4 1
Social psychology also recognizes two types of conformity: pri-
vate conformity and public conformity."'4 Private conformity de-
scribes when the influences of others cause a person to change
her mind to conform to the group influence.' Public conformity,
or compliance, describes when a person only acts as the group
acts, but may not actually agree with it.''
In Sherif's experiment, where the correct answer was ambigu-
ous, the influence tended to be informational and led to private
acceptance.' 5 ' The group provided information, and individuals
accepted that information as evidence of reality and privately be-
lieved their conforming decisions to be true."' Sherif confirmed
142. Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 635.
143. See id. at 629; BORDENS & HOROWITZ, supra note 136, at 238; see also GILBERT,
FISKE & LINDZEY, supra note 128, at 157; KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note 126, at
226-27.
144. See Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 629.
145. See KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note 126, at 226-27.
146. See BORDENS & HOROWITZ, supra note 136, at 239.
147. See KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note 126, at 227.
148. See Asch 1951, supra note 120, at 230-33.
149. See KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note 126, at 227.
150. See id. at 228.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 229, Table 7.1.
153. See id. at 228-29 & Table 7.1.
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this effect by retesting the subjects privately at the end of the ex-
periment. 154 Even when removed from the group, individuals' es-
timates continued to reflect the norm established in their group."5 s
Subsequent researchers confirmed that the influence still existed
a year later.'
The reasons given for conformity in Asch's experiment were
more mixed. In follow-up interviews, some subjects reported that
they thought the group was incorrect, but conformed so as not to
appear as a deviant within the group.5 1 Other subjects reported
that they conformed to the group because they decided that their
perceptions were inaccurate.15' The remaining subjects reported
that they perceived the majority's clearly incorrect answer to be
correct-that is, the group influence appeared to have actually
changed their private perceptions." A more recent follow-up ex-
periment using fMRIs suggests that the group influence can in
fact alter private perceptions.'
These studies form the foundation for most social psychology
research into conformity and majority influences. Later studies
on conformity show that individuals are influenced by their per-
ception of majority norms, even without the group being present
or announcing its opinion.
154. See id. at 228.
155. See id.
156. See Rohrer et al., supra note 118, at 596.
157. Asch 1951, supra note 120, at 229.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Berns et al., supra note 117, at 251.
161. For example, in a study of alcohol use and perceptions on campus, researchers
found that the average male student was less comfortable with alcohol use on campus
than he perceived the average student to be-meaning, of course, that the actual comfort
with alcohol on campus was much less than students believed-but male students moved
towards the perceived norm of being more comfortable with alcohol consumption over
time. Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation of
Social Norms by Unwitting Actors, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 161,
172-75 (1996). Similarly, in studies of what motivates people to conserve, researchers
found that telling individuals how the majority behaves was more effective than giving
reasons for conserving. Noah J. Goldstein, Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicius, A
Room With a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in
Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 472, 474, 477 (2008); Vladas Griskevicius, Robert B. Cialdini
& Noah J. Goldstein, Social Norms: An Underestimated and Underemployed Lever for
Managing Climate Change, 3 INT'L J. SUSTAINABILITY COMMC'N 5, 10-11 (2008). The re-
searchers specifically looked at how to increase reuse of towels in a hotel to promote con-
servation. Social Norms at 10. The researchers placed cards in hotel bathrooms that said
[Vol. 49:465488
IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE
C. Surveillance-Related Studies
The above studies on conformity show that individuals often
wish to conform to perceived group norms. But what are the ef-
fects of surveillance, and how do they connect to the tendency to
conform?
The perception that one is being observed is enough to cause a
change in behavior."' This knowledge that observation affects be-
havior has been used and studied as a management tactic.'6 3 Sur-
veillance can encourage accountability and even moral behavior-
but accountability to the majority might not always be desirable
and might have unintended consequences. 64 Recently, police of-
ficers in Los Angeles, whose cars were outfitted with voice record-
ing devices and in-car video cameras, tampered with the record-
one of the following: "Help Save the Environment," "Partner with Us to Help Save the En-
vironment," and "Join Your Fellow Guests in Helping to Save the Environment." Id. at 10.
The last card, which also stated that the majority of hotel guests reuse towels, was the
most influential, increasing reuse by 34%. Id. Similarly, a researcher found that merely
telling an individual how much energy neighbors with comparable houses consume will
get that individual, if she is above the norm, to reduce energy by approximately 2%. Hunt
Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1082, 1082-83 (2011).
Consumption changed relative to the norm. Id. at 1093. Households in the top decile re-
duced consumption by 6.3%. Id. at 1090. The mean was about 2%. Id. at 1087. Of course,
norms are not necessarily good. Other studies have shown that providing information on
the norm can actually cause individuals consuming less energy than the norm to increase
their consumption. P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Recoastruc-
tive Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 432 (2007). Other studies have found
this effect relatively easy to counter by giving additional "injunctive norms" which convey
that the below-norm behavior is pro-social. Allcott, supra at 1083. In Allcott's study this
was accomplished by adding a "smiley face" next to the norm information when it indicat-
ed that a consumer was below the norm. Id.
162. See John R. Aiello, The Effects of Computer Monitoring, Standards, and Rewards
on Work Performance, Job Satisfaction, and Stress, 23 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 499,
502-03 (1993); John R. Aiello & Kathryn J. Kolb, Electronic Performance Monitoring and
Social Context: Impact on Productivity and Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 339, 348
(1995); Watson et al., supra note 119, at 650; see also M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepti-
cism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1039 (2012) (recognizing
the effect of observation on behavior).
163. See, e.g., Aiello, supra note 162, at 502-03; Aiello & Kolb, supra note 162, at 348;
Kirstie Ball & David C. Wilson, Power, Control and Computer-Based Performance Moni-
toring: Repertoires, Resistance and Subjectives, 21 ORG. STUD. 539, 561-62 (2000); Nick
Kinnie, Sue Hutchinson & John Purcell, 'Fun and Surveillance'- The Paradox of High
Commitment Management in Call Centres, 11 INT'L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 967, 968
(2000); Watson et al., supra note 119, at 650.
164. John R. Aiello & Carol M. Svec, Computer Monitoring of Work Performance: Ex-
tending the Social Facilitation Framework to Electronic Presence, 23 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 537, 543 (1993).
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ing equipment to avoid being monitored while on duty."' The
equipment was intended to deter police misconduct, increase
transparency, build trust in the communities in which the police
operated, and defend officers against false accusations of miscon-
duct."' But officers may have decided not to change their behav-
ior, or that being monitored had other costs and effects.
There are other compelling examples of awareness of surveil-
lance changing individual behavior. In a study of over 100,000
voters in the 2006 primary election in Michigan, researchers were
able to increase voter turnout just by sending a single letter in-
forming voters they were being studied.16 7 The knowledge that
someone was observing their behavior caused potential voters to
behave in a way they considered more socially desirable.6"' Simi-
larly, a number of researchers have found that people were more
likely to conform to perceived acceptable behavior when a picture
of a pair of eyes was present (although the effect lasted only a
short time).6"' In one study, putting a picture of eyes above a box
collecting money to pay for office coffee and tea caused people to
contribute nearly three times as much money as they did without
the eyes.7 o In another study, researchers observed a 60% drop in
bicycle thefts by placing a pair of eyes above a bicycle rack with
the words "Cycle Thieves, We Are Watching You.""' A third study
found the odds of littering halved in a university cafeteria in the
presence of posters with eyes. 2 Another study predicted and
165. See Joel Rubin, Officers Tamper with In-Car Devices, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2014, at
Al.
166. Id.
167. Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green & Christopher W. Larimer, Social Pressure and
Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. Sol. REV. 33,
38-39 (2008).
168. Id. at 39-40.
169. Melissa Bateson, Daniel Nettle & Gilbert Roberts, Cues of Being Watched En-
hance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 412 (2006); Daniel
Nettle, Kenneth Nott & Melissa Bateson, 'Cycle Thieves, We Are Watching You: Impact of
a Simple Signage Intervention Against Bicycle Theft, 7 PLOS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 1-2,
available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0051
738. See generally Adam Sparks & Pat Barclay, Eye Images Increase Generosity, But Not
for Long: The Limited Effect of a False Cue, 34 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 317, 318 (2013)
(summarizing the "eye image" studies).
170. Cues of Being Watched, supra note 169, at 412.
171. Cycle Thieves, supra note 169, at 2.
172. Max Ernest-Jones, Daniel Nettle & Melissa Bateson, Effects of Eye Images on Eve-
ryday Cooperative Behavior: A Field Experiment, 32 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 172, 174-
75 (2011).
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found that participants exposed to surveillance cues such as a
picture of eyes "would provide stronger endorsements of moral
norms by rating moral transgressions as more serious than con-
trol participants.""' These studies demonstrate that even the
suggestion of being watched can have a strong impact on human
behavior,"' and that the change in behavior may be involuntary
and subconscious.'7
The most relevant study on surveillance's effects on opinion
formation and articulation was conducted by Gregory White and
Philip Zimbardo in the late 1970s, during another period of wide-
spread public concern about surveillance."'7 The researchers told
the subjects (students at University of California Los Angeles
("UCLA")) that they were conducting a study on student move-
ments and asked each subject to prepare and give a short talk on
whether "[m]arijuana possession in small quantities should be a
misdemeanor, but in large quantities should be a felony."'77 The
researchers told the subjects that the talks would be vide-
otaped.'76 A little more than half of the subjects were also told
that copies of the videotapes would be provided to the police and
FBI for training purposes; the other half were told the videotapes
would just be used by the researchers.' Only a subset of each
group was actually videotaped.' The researchers told the other
subsets that the video camera had broken and they would just
use a tape recorder, which would not be shared with the police
and FBI.'' The researchers analyzed the talks and post-talk
mood questionnaires of over seventy subjects.'
173. Pierrick Bourrat, Nicolas Baumard & Ryan McKay, Surveillance Cues Enhance
Moral Condemnation, 9 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 193, 194 (2011).
174. Of course, images of eyes are not watching anyone, which some researchers argue
is the reason that other studies have found limited or no effect from images of eyes on be-
havior. See Sparks & Barclay, supra note 169, at 317-18. Nevertheless, most studies have
found an effect, id. at 318, which strongly suggests that the belief in widespread surveil-
lance, especially when coupled with a surveillance cue, will lead people to change behav-
ior.
175. See id. at 320-21.
176. White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 49-50.
177. Id. at 52-53.
178. Id. at 51.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 53.
182. Id. at 52, 55.
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Surveillance or even the threat of it had a significant effect.
Pretest questionnaires revealed that students at UCLA at the
time were split roughly evenly as to whether they agreed with the
advocacy statement.'3 However, of the subjects in the experi-
ment, only 44% of those in the surveillance group advocated for
the legalization of marijuana, while 73% of the group not subject
to surveillance advocated for legalization.184 Nevertheless, 67% of
all subjects reported using marijuana in the past."8 ' Furthermore,
those in the surveillance group tried to distinguish themselves
from their arguments, consistently using second and third person
pronouns rather than the first-person that other subjects general-
ly used."' The researchers concluded that those under surveil-
lance were less likely to advocate legalization or reduction in
penalties. 187
White and Zimbardo also found that those who had been told
that they were going to be surveilled by the police, but then were
not because the "camera broke," remained influenced by the mere
threat of surveillance."' The researchers concluded that the "ex-
periment demonstrates that the threat of surveillance exerts a
powerful influence over behavior, beliefs, and feelings, whether or
not that threat is realized."8"' Interestingly, both the subjects of
the actual surveillance and the surveillance-threat self-reported
that they performed honestly, and did not believe that the sur-
veillance had influenced their opinion or statements even though
the results of the study strongly suggested that it did.8 o
These studies establish that a desire to conform to social norms
(or perceived social norms) causes individuals to alter their be-
havior and even their beliefs. Further, awareness of being ob-
served or even the suggestion of observation can be enough to al-
ter behavior. This provides a strong foundation to suspect that
surveillance of a person's Internet and reading activity could have
an impact on what that person reads and could even influence be-
183. Id. at 54.
184. Id. at 58.
185. Id. at 59.
186. Id. at 57, 59.
187. Id. at 59.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 56, 59-60.
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liefs. These studies support the intuitions of those legislatures
and judges who believe that chilling effects exist.
IV. THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, OR THE CONFORMING
EFFECT
The idea that surveillance has a conforming effect, and that
this conforming effect might have First Amendment consequenc-
es, has not gone unremarked in either the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence or the legal literature. But the legal understanding of
this conforming effect is limited. This section identifies how the
Supreme Court and legal scholars have understood the "tyranny
of the majority" and explain what social science adds to this un-
derstanding.
A. Legal Analysis of the Tyranny of the Majority
The core of modern First Amendment doctrine, under any theo-
ry of the First Amendment, is the protection of minority view-
points. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the
First Amendment protects even the most unpopular or distasteful
ideas, and the Court is highly skeptical of viewpoint discrimina-
tion and other attempts to instill intellectual conformity."' For
example, the Court has stated that "[i]f there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion."
In a foundational case supporting the right to receive infor-
mation, the Supreme Court connected the right to receive infor-
mation to the protection of minority views from community at-
tempts at instilling conformity."' In Martin v. City of Struthers,
the Court found a prohibition on door-to-door distribution of leaf-
lets unconstitutional."' The Court explained that this particular
method of distribution is protected by the First Amendment, rea-
soning that "[d]oor to door distribution of circulars is essential to
191. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
192. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
193. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943).
194. Id. at 142, 149.
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the poorly financed causes of little people.""' In other words, soci-
ety must allow the distribution of circulars if poorly funded mi-
nority speech is to reach an audience. And protecting minority
speech serves the core purpose of the First Amendment: "The au-
thors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconven-
tional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to en-
courage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.""
The Court found that the ordinance was unconstitutional because
it did not allow for true heterogeneity of opinion."' The ordinance
impermissibly "substitute[d] the judgment of the community for
the judgment of the individual householder.""
The Court's perhaps most well-known case supporting a right
to read in private, Stanley v. Georgia, also emphasizes the cen-
trality of protecting diversity of thought rather than allowing for
state control and conformity.' The Court stated, "Whatever the
power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimi-
cal to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legis-
lation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts."2 0 Georgia's assertion that it should be permitted to
protect an individual's mind from the consequences of viewing ob-
scenity is "wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First
Amendment."20 ' An individual has a "right to read or observe
what he pleases," at least within the privacy of his home.202 The
Court in Stanley emphasized protection from government control,
not majority influence, though the government can be understood
as standing in on the part of the majority.0
The jurisprudence around the right to receive and the right to
receive information privately thus acknowledges the centrality of
protecting minority points of view. The state cannot condemn a
minority viewpoint, and it cannot make it more difficult for an
195. Id. at 146.
196. Id. at 143.
197. Id. at 149.
198. Id. at 143-44.
199. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
200. Id. at 566.
201. Id. at 565-66.
202. See id. at 568.
203. See id. at 565-66.
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individual to access information about a particular minority
viewpoint. But, what if the state merely participates in revealing
to the public that a person holds that minority point of view?
The Supreme Court has stated that laws that deter the expres-
sion of minority viewpoints by airing the identities of their hold-
ers are also unconstitutional.20 4 In Lamont, the Court found un-
constitutional a requirement that mail recipients write in to
request communist literature.20 ' The state had an impermissible
role in identifying this minority viewpoint and condemning it.20 6
The Court reasoned that "any addressee is likely to feel some in-
hibition in sending for literature which federal officials have con-
demned as 'communist political propaganda."'2 07 The individual's
inhibition stems from the state's obvious condemnation, but also
from a fear of social repercussions (by the state as an employer).2 08
The Court found that the requirement that a person identify her-
self as a communist "is almost certain to have a deterrent ef-
fect."200
The Court has recognized that action by private parties can de-
ter individuals from holding minority viewpoints-and that the
state can spur private action by revealing the identity of those in
the minority.2 10 In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court observed that
"compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advo-
cacy may constitute a[n] effective [ restraint on freedom of asso-
ciation."21  This is true "particularly where a group espouses dis-
sident beliefs."2 12 However, the Court's reason for finding that the
holders of minority viewpoints might withdraw or be dissuaded
from joining that viewpoint is not because of mere social pressure
to conform to a majority view. It is, as discussed above, because
204. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[I]nhibition as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment
rights is a power denied to government.").
205. Id. at 307.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
211. Id. at 462.
212. Id.
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the plaintiffs made an "uncontroverted showing" of "economic re-
prisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility."2 13
The Supreme Court famously stated that "[a]nonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority."1 But the tyranny of the
majority that the Court has envisioned often seems to stem from
the possibility of retaliation (even though McIntyre was not re-
quired to make a showing of a likelihood of retaliation, and nei-
ther was the anonymous door-to-door speaker in Watchtower Bi-
ble & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton). An
intolerant society may retaliate against a speaker, thus suppress-
ing minority ideas. Anonymity "exemplifies the purpose behind
the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to
protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas
from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society."21 5
There is thus substantial jurisprudential support for the ideas
that: (1) minority speech should in particular be protected; and
(2) the majority often attempts to encroach on or eviscerate mi-
nority points of view. Nevertheless, while recognizing that the
majority can exert tyrannical control over minority views, the
Court leans heavily on actual threats of retaliation.2 16 Courts of-
ten recognize that the majority limits minority viewpoints only
when the majority actively tries to suppress minority views by
punishing their holders.2 17 This jurisprudential characterization
might explain why some (including members of the Court) are
skeptical of the need to protect First Amendment privacy. If you
do believe that the holders of minority viewpoints are repressed
only when the majority retaliates against them, and you believe
that minorities do not always face actual retaliation, then why
protect minority speakers or readers from view?
A number of legal scholars, by contrast, assume that a conform-
ing effect exists.2 18 The tyranny of the majority is not solely based
213. Id.
214. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63.
218. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Ob-
ject, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000) (explaining that being watched "will constrain, ex
ante, the acceptable spectrum of belief and behavior"); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility,
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on threats of retaliation; when people's viewpoints are exposed,
they will be innately drawn towards the majority view.21 9 Drawing
on Michel Foucault's depiction of Jeremy Bentham's famous Pan-
opticon, these scholars wholeheartedly subscribe to the under-
standing that surveillance can cause conformity to the group's
norms.220 People behave, or at least behave differently, when they
know they are being watched.
Only a few in legal literature, however, have noted the extent
of support for this view in the social science. And their focus has
been primarily on the tendency of people to conform to group
norms, not on the relationship between surveillance and the con-
forming effect.2 2' Cass Sunstein has noted a general human ten-
dency towards conformity, with the view towards using that con-
forming tendency to nudge behavior in desirable ways.222
Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 186 (2008) ("Surveillance in the pan-
optic sense thus functions both descriptively and normatively. It does not simply render
personal information accessible but rather seeks to render individual behaviors and pref-
erences transparent by conforming them to preexisting frameworks."); Richards, supra
note 3, at 403-04 ("The knowledge that others are watching (or may be watching) tends
the preference of the individual towards the bland and the mainstream. Thoroughgoing
surveillance, whether by public or private actors, has a normalizing and stifling effect.");
Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 838-43 (2000)
(discussing how social pressure can result in individuals misrepresenting their genuine
wants to join perceived majorities, and how this can be manipulated for political ends); see
also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the
Right to Anonymity, 72 MIss. L.J. 213, 240-41, 245 (2002) (discussing Foucault and Ben-
tham and noting that the "small amount of social science research specifically aimed at
assessing the impact of concerted surveillance tends to verify that [surveillance inhibits
behavior]").
219. Richards, supra note 3, at 403-04.
220. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 217
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). See generally JEREMY BENTHAM,
Panopticon; or, The Inspection House, in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37 (John
Bowring ed., 1787).
221. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 352-59 (1997) (citing extensive social science research that seeks to under-
stand why people do or do not commit crimes, and the social influences that can affect the-
se outcomes); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 341, 343 (1997) (discussing the importance of social norms in influ-
encing behavior and arguing that privacy can be used to circumvent the effects of norms).
222. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 1 (2003) (arguing that the
human tendency to conform can lead to harmful outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907, 967 (1996) (arguing that lawmakers
must understand the influence of norms on human behavior and that laws and regulations
can be used to shape norms which can influence behavior in beneficial ways).
2015]1 497
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Blitz comes closest in recognizing the value of social science for
informing the legal understanding of the relationship between
conformity and surveillance. Blitz has touted the important func-
tion libraries serve as institutions that protect individuals from
the constraints of social interactions and allow deviance from the
majority view.223 Blitz cites the Solomon and Asch studies dis-
cussed previously for the proposition that people fear being re-
224garded as different, or as disagreeing with the group consensus.
Protecting libraries as a space for private contemplation and ex-
ploration allows individuals to both hold nonconforming views in
private and explore new viewpoints.2 " However, Blitz does not ex-
tend these studies to discuss their broader implications for more
wholesale treatment of reader and viewer privacy.
B. Social Science Research and the Conforming Effect
Social science research provides substantially more support for
the connection between surveillance and conformity than the le-
gal literature or doctrine has heretofore acknowledged. Courts,
theorists, and legislatures have long worried about chilling ef-
fects. Anecdotal evidence,' studies,22 7 and a growing chorus of au-
thors and journalists2 . support the existence of chilling effects.
Much of this research, however, focuses on identifying writers
223. Blitz, supra note 3, at 826-27.
224. Id. at 824 (citing studies conducted by Muzafer Sherif and Solomon Asch); see su-
pra Part III.A.
225. Blitz, supra note 3, at 803.
226. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, 22 Examples of NSA Surveillance Creating Chilling Ef-
fects, TECHDIRT (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131108/10430625184
/22-examples-nsa-surveillance-creating-chilling-effects.shtml.
227. THE FDR GROUP, supra note 52, at 3. In another study on the effects of the exten-
sive surveillance of students in the United Kingdom, researchers concluded that "[flor
some pupils surveillance had a 'chilling effect' in that it made them acutely aware that
their actions were being monitored and led them to change 'legitimate' forms of behaviour
or activities due to a concern that their actions could be misinterpreted by the 'surveyors."'
Michael McCahill & Rachel Finn, The Social Impact of Surveillance in Three UK Schools:
'Angels,' 'Devils' and 'Teen Mums,' 7 SURVEILLANCE & SOC'Y 273, 283 (2010), available at
http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/4156/415 9 .
Some students reported being particularly nervous using computers. Id.
228. International Bill of Digital Rights: Call from 500 Writers Around the World,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2013, at 28, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/
10/international-bill-digital-rights-petition-text; Open Letter to Senate Leadership: Mass
Surveillance Is Censorship, THE HILL (July 24, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-bl
og/civil-rights/213132-open-letter-to-senate-leadership-mass-surveillance-is.
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who are aware that they have self-censored. 229 A true understand-
ing of the consequences of surveillance requires asking more
broadly how individuals may be influenced to change their behav-
ior, including those not aware of any change.
In our review of the existing social psychology research, we
could find no studies that definitely measured chilling effects as
they are discussed in the legal literature. However, social psy-
chologists have clearly shown that people are influenced by group
norms, sometimes to the point of invalidating their own judg-
ments-even without any threat of retaliation or other harm. The
White and Zimbardo study suggested that political speech was
chilled by surveillance, or even the threat of it.2 30 The studies dis-
cussed above that employed a picture of eyes to change behavior
demonstrate that the mere suggestion of surveillance influences
people, even when there is no actual surveillance.23 '
Although more research needs to be done in this area, the ex-
isting evidence is strong enough to conclude that widespread sur-
veillance, or even the belief in it, is damaging to the development
of diverse viewpoints, without any additional clear threat of inju-
ry or retaliation. The existing research also indicates who is most
likely to be chilled by surveillance-the undecided-and that the
consequences of surveillance extend beyond traditional chilling
effects.
This article names these consequences "the conforming effect."
Four features of the conforming effect go beyond chilling speech,
while still strongly implicating First Amendment concerns. First,
surveillance tends to more strongly influence those who are unde-
cided in their beliefs.232 Second, surveillance can increase anxiety
and unease, which makes it more difficult for people to form intel-
lectual thoughts.' Third, surveillance can encourage people to
change their beliefs by creating cognitive dissonance in those who
229. THE FDR GROUP, supra note 52, at 6-8.
230. See White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 59.
231. Cues of Being Watched, supra note 169, at 412; Gerber, Green & Larimer, supra
note 167, at 33-34.
232. See Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 634.
233. See White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 56.
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self-censor.234 Fourth, surveillance weakens minority influence."'
In sum, surveillance encourages less reasoned majority rule.
1. The Undecided
Although individuals with strong minority opinions and beliefs
may be most aware of surveillance and feel the chilling effect, so-
cial science research in fact suggests that surveillance most influ-
ences the person who is undecided.236 Most distressingly, an unde-
cided person is unlikely to be aware that she is being influenced
by surveillance, even while the influence is happening.
Social psychologists have found that "the more uncertain the
individual is about the correctness of his judgment, the more like-
ly he is to be susceptible to social influences in making his judg-
ment."2 " Surveillance will not have as significant of an effect on
people who feel strongly about what they are doing or are confi-
dent in their positions, especially those that have already taken a
public position on a subject.2 38 In the White and Zimbardo study of
student positions on marijuana use, students who had participat-
ed in any group that advocated for legalization were less anxious,
less inhibited, and more honest in their responses.239
A similar effect is seen in the differences between the Asch and
Sherif studies. In Asch's study, a surprising number of people
conformed to an obviously incorrect answer, but the majority of
the time, the individuals resisted the norm and selected the obvi-
ously correct answer.24 In Sherif s study, where there was no ob-
viously correct answer and thus subjects were truly undecided,
the vast majority of people conformed to the norm.2 4 1 In a follow-
up to Asch's experiment, other researchers performed the same
basic experiment, but had people commit to their answers in var-
234. See BORDENS & HOROWITZ, supra note 136, at 221.
235. See KEITH N. HAMPTON ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE 'SPIRAL OF SILENCE,' PEW
RESEARCH CTR. 8, 23 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/08/PISocial-networks
-and-debate_082614.pdf.
236. See Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 634.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 633.
239. White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 57.
240. Asch 1955, supra note 137, at 34.
241. BORDENS & HOROWITZ, supra note 136, at 245 (noting Sherif found conformity
rates of about 70%).
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ious ways, such as by having each individual write down her an-
swer before anyone in the group gave her answer out loud.242 This
commitment to an answer also had a significant effect on reduc-
ing conformity.243
All of this suggests that while we should be concerned with
chilling the speech of individuals who are already advocates for a
minority position, we should also be concerned about the effect of
surveillance on those who are not yet committed to a position.
Someone only interested in or curious about a controversial idea
is the type of person most likely to be influenced by surveillance's
conforming influence. In the absence of surveillance, a curious
person might do a Google search to investigate a new topic, but in
the presence of surveillance the same person might not feel com-
fortable even asking the question.
2. Anxiety and Unease
There is evidence that surveillance can increase anxiety and
unease.244 An increase in these emotions can in turn inhibit cogni-
tive abilities, learning, and complex decision-making.24 5
In the White and Zimbardo study of students' opinions on the
legalization of marijuana, those students who were told they were
being surveilled reported being angry and uneasy, and scored
higher on anxiety and inhibition factors.246 In general, feeling un-
easy can cause a person to be less honest and less willing to dis-
close socially undesirable thoughts and behaviors.4 Researchers
242. Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 631-32.
243. Id. at 633.
244. White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 56.
245. Aiello & Kolb, supra note 162, at 348-49; Paul Dolan et al., Influencing Behaviour:
The Mindspace Way, 33 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 264, 271 (2012); White & Zimbardo, supra note
1, at 50-51.
246. White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 56 & Table 1, 59. Those that had already tak-
en a public position on legalization were less anxious and less inhibited. Id. at 57. Anecdo-
tally, surveillance can have extreme consequences. Mary Chesney Lardern, an actress
blacklisted during the McCarthy Era described the threat of surveillance as affecting her
ability to make friends and build trusting relationships. David Cunningham & John
Noakes, "What If She's from the FBI?" The Effects of Covert Forms of Social Control on So-
cial Movements, in 10 SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW AND DEVIANCE: SURVEILLANCE AND
GOVERNANCE: CRIME CONTROL AND BEYOND 175, 176 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 2008).
247. See Adam L. Alter & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Suppressing Secrecy Through Meta-
cognitive Ease: Cognitive Fluency Encourages Self-Disclosure, 20 PSYCHOL. SC. 1414,
1414-15 (2009).
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have attributed the relative unwillingness of citizens in Italy and
Germany to express political views after World War II to those
countries' legacies of surveillance.2
Studies on workplace surveillance find that surveillance can
increase distress and unease, negatively impacting learning.249
Researchers have shown that surveillance in the workplace spe-
cifically affects workers' abilities to perform tasks.5 o Some studies
have shown increases in efficiency and accuracy in low-
complexity clerical tasks, but significant impairments on the abil-
ity to complete complex tasks.25 1 Another study found that in-
creased surveillance leads to less effective brainstorming.2 2
Surveillance's effects on emotion have cognitive impacts, as
emotion can have a powerful influence on decision-making. A per-
son often makes a decision based upon emotional reaction with-
out a cognitive evaluation.2 " The consequences of anxiety or an-
ger can be significant. Anxiety tends to make a person more risk-
averse and more conservative." Anger, on the other hand, leads
to reduced perceptions of risk.25 5 Anger also tends to make people
less thoughtful.'
Again, more research is required to understand the conse-
quences of surveillance, but the existing research suggests that
248. Samuel J. Best, Brian S. Krueger & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, Al Qaeda Versus
Big Brother: Anxiety About Government Monitoring and Support for Domestic Counterter-
rorism Policies, 34 POL. BEHAV. 607, 611 (2011) (citing GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY
VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 81-
82 (1963)).
249. See, e.g., Aiello, supra note 162, at 501; Aiello & Kolb, supra note 162, at 348-49;
Watson et al., supra note 119, at 643, 652-53, 655.
250. Aiello & Kolb, supra note 162, at 348-49.
251. See Aiello & Svec, supra note 164, at 538, 543, 545; see also Nemeth, supra note
127, at 25 ("[T]he high degree of stress reported by persons exposed to the opposing major-
ity view may well cause narrowing of attention and poorer performance on complex tasks.
252. See Paul B. Paulus, Timothy S. Larey & Anita H. Ortega, Performance and Per-
ceptions of Brainstormers in an Organizational Setting, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 249, 258 (1995) (finding group brainstorming half as effective as individual
brainstorming).
253. Dolan et al., supra note 245, at 271.
254. See Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman & Erin Cassese, On the Distinct Political Ef-
fects of Anxiety and Anger, in THE AFFECT EFFECT: DYNAMICS OF EMOTION IN POLITICAL
THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 202, 228 (W. Russell Neuman et al. eds., 2007).
255. See id.
256. See id. at 226.
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surveillance could both impair thinking and influence people's as-
sessments of risk.
3. Subconsciously Changing Beliefs
As previously noted, social psychologists have observed two
kinds of conformity: public conformity and private conformity.2 " A
person who publicly conforms does not change her underlying be-
liefs; she only puts on a performance for others.2 58 However, stud-
ies suggest that even if surveillance causes public conformity,
cognitive dissonance can cause a person to gradually change her
underlying beliefs to match her opinions to her public perfor-
mance.
People often use their own public behavior as a heuristic by
which they judge what they stand for.2" Thus, repeated actions
can define what a person believes and sometimes change what a
person believes. If a person's actions are inconsistent with her at-
titudes, this generally creates an uncomfortable psychological
state that she will be motivated to reduce.260 Social psychologists
have named this state "cognitive dissonance."2 6' Cognitive disso-
nance theory states that when attitudes and behavior conflict, it
causes a negative motivational state that will cause a person to
either rationalize the inconsistency or change her attitude or be-
havior.' Dissonance arises when a person makes a choice and
when that choice is inconsistent with her beliefs."
257. See KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra note 126, at 228.
258. See id.
259. BORDENS & HOROWITZ, supra note 136, at 221; see also Robert B. Cialdini & Noah
J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591,
602 (2004) ("People have a strong need to enhance their self-concepts by behaving consist-
ently with their actions, statements, commitments, beliefs, and self-ascribed traits.").
260. Cialdini & Goldstein, supra note 259, at 604.
261. Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance
Theory and an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in COGNITIVE DISSONANCE:
PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 3 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Jud-
son Mills eds., 1999).
262. BORDENS & HOROWITZ, supra note 136, at 216; Harmon-Jones & Mills, supra note
261, at 4.
263. Darwyn E. Linder, Joel Cooper & Edward E. Jones, Decision Freedom as a Deter-
minant of the Role of Incentive Magnitude in Attitude Change, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 245, 245 (1967).
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For example, in the classic study of the phenomenon, subjects
were asked to complete an extremely boring series of tasks over
the course of an hour.2 64 At the end of the hour, each subject was
asked to tell a new subject-actually a researcher-that the ex-
periment was enjoyable.265 Different groups of subjects were of-
fered $1 or $20 if they agreed to say that the experiment was en-
joyable.266 Then, all of the subjects were asked to fill out a survey
about the experiment.267 Those in the control group who were not
asked to describe the experiment to anyone rated the tasks as
boring on the survey, as did those who received $20.26" However,
those who were only paid $1 rated the tasks as enjoyable. 2" The
researchers theorized that because $20 was quite a bit of money
in 1959, when the experiment was conducted, those who received
$20 were easily able to justify lying to the "new subjects" that the
experiment was enjoyable in order to receive the substantial fi-
nancial award. 270 Those who received only a dollar did not have
such an easy justification.2 7' Another scholar explained the think-
ing of those who only received a dollar like this: "'I lied to some-
one because the experimenter asked me to, and I got paid only a
buck."'27 2 "Conclusion: 'Either I am a liar or I am stupid."' 273 Be-
cause the behavior cannot be changed, the subject must rational-
ize the behavior: "I'm not a liar or stupid, so I must have meant
what I said. I enjoyed the experiment."2 74 Subsequent studies
have found that cognitive dissonance can also be induced by
threats of punishment.2 75
Surveillance has the capacity to induce cognitive dissonance. A
person might believe that there is nothing wrong with looking at
264. Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compli-
ance, 58 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 203, 205 (1959).
265. Id. at 207.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 206.
268. Id. at 207.
269. Id.
270. BORDENS & HOROWITZ, supra note 136, at 217.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Elliot Aronson & J. Merrill Carlsmith, Effect of the Severity of Threat on the De-
valuation of Forbidden Behavior, 66 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 584, 586 (1963) (find-
ing attitudinal changes in children based on dissonance created by the threat of a mild
punishment); see Harmon-Jones & Mills, supra note 261, at 8-10.
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a given book or reading about a particular political group, but if
the person chose not to look at that material because of surveil-
lance, that decision could create cognitive dissonance. Surveil-
lance shares many of the characteristics researchers have identi-
fied as possibly contributing to an attitudinal change based on
cognitive dissonance."' First, the behavior-not reading some-
thing-has the negative consequence of depriving the individual
reader of something she wants."' Second, the reader will feel per-
sonal responsibility for the deprivation because she is free to ig-
nore the surveillance and read the material, and because the
consequence-being deprived of the reading material-is foresee-
able."' Third, because in most cases the reader is likely to believe
that the consequences of ignoring the surveillance are minimal,
the action will not be easy to justify, and thus the reader is likely
to experience a state of dissonance arousal."' Fourth, if the reader
attributes the state of psychological arousal to her own behavior
in choosing not to read something she wanted to read, rather
than to some other external factor, the dissonance arousal be-
comes dissonance motivation, which is likely to lead to attitudinal
change.280 Thus, the decision to not read something because of
surveillance could actually lead to an underlying attitudinal
change in the reader, such that she no longer thinks the previous-
ly desired material is interesting or worth reading.
Although not specifically tested for in the White and Zimbardo
experiment, cognitive dissonance helps explain why many of the
students' statements seemed unlikely to reflect their actual be-
liefs, even though after making the statements the students
claimed the statements reflected their honest opinions.2 81 If, as
the experiment suggested, the students under surveillance and
threatened with surveillance conditions gave fewer pro-
legalization statements than they otherwise might have, this may
276. See Joel Cooper & Russell H. Fazio, A New Look at Dissonance Theory, 17
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 229, 241, 243 (1984) (summarizing the steps
necessary for attitudinal change based on dissonance); KASSIN, FEIN & MARKUS, supra
note 126, at 211-13 (reviewing Cooper and Fazio's steps and noting some disagreement
over whether all of the steps are necessary or if others are missing).
277. See Cooper & Fazio, supra note 276, at 232-36.
278. See id. at 236-41.
279. See id. at 241, 243.
280. See id. at 256-57.
281. Cf. id. (explaining the occurrence of dissonance motivation).
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have created cognitive dissonance.282 The decision to make a less
pro-legalization statement would have been difficult to justify be-
cause there was no clear threat of punishment or other way to ra-
tionalize the statement. Thus, rather than face the cogitative dis-
sonance from having publicly made a statement they did not
agree with, many of the students may have subconsciously adopt-
ed the public statement as their actual opinion.
4. Weakened Minority
Surveillance can weaken minority influences. Minority influ-
ences have been shown to foster better, more deliberate, and more
creative thinking than majority influence.' This happens, in
part, because minority influence stimulates critical thought.8 4
Minority influence has been measured across a variety of do-
mains, in topics as diverse as color perception, jury decisions, mi-
grant workers, feminism, the military, pollution, the death penal-
ty, and abortion."' It is one of the key mechanisms by which
individuals change their opinions. Even when minority opinions
are wrong, "they contribute to the detection of novel solutions and
decisions that, on balance, are qualitatively better."288 Psycholo-
gists attribute many intellectual revolutions to minority influ-
ence.m They put forward the influences of thinkers such as Gali-
leo, Marx, Freud, as well as minority social movements such as
282. See White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 57-59; see also Cooper & Fazio, supra note
276, at 241 (describing how dissonance develops).
283. See Serge Moscovici & Elisabeth Lage, Studies in Social Influence III: Majority
Versus Minority Influence in a Group, 6 EURo. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 162-63 (1976) (show.
ing that minority influence appears immediately); Nemeth, supra note 127, at 24. "Indi-
viduals assimilate the opinion of the agent of influence at a latent level and their underly-
ing response code is thereby modified ... . [The extent of minority influence is much
greater than analysis of explicit judgments would suggest." Moscovici & Lage supra at
172.
284. Carsten K. W. De Dreu & Michael A. West, Minority Dissent and Team Innova-
tion: The Importance of Participation in Decision Making, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1191,
1199 (2001).
285. Anne Maass & Russell D. Clark III, Hidden Impact of Minorities: Fifteen Years of
Minority Influence Research, 95 PSYCHOL. BULL. 428, 433 (1984) (citing studies by a varie-
ty of researchers).
286. Nemeth, supra note 127, at 23, 28-31.
287. See SERGE MOSCOVICI, SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 41, 221 (Carol
Sherrard & Greta Heinz trans., 1976) (identifying "individuals ... who have had a great
impact on our ideas and behaviour" and discussing the impact of minorities on social
change).
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the civil rights, antiwar, and environmental movements, as ex-
amples of these minority influences."'
However, being in the minority is hard. People have a basic
need to feel good about themselves,2 89 and minorities are generally
disliked and sometimes threatened by the majority, especially
when the minority is one person.290 A 2014 Pew Research Center
study found that people were only half as likely to join a conver-
sation on a controversial subject on Facebook if they thought
their friends disagreed with their position.29 ' The study's authors
explain that their observations confirm a long-studied offline
phenomenon called the "spiral of silence," which observes that
people are less likely to speak up about policy issues in public
when they believe they are in the minority.29 2 The recent study,
about how people felt about the Snowden-NSA disclosures, also
found that social media users thought they knew the views of
those around them.2" The same social media users were less like-
ly than non-social media users to discuss the Snowden issues in
any context, online or off.294 Awareness of surveillance likely
makes people more sensitive to being in a minority, thus interfer-
ing with their willingness to share opinions.
The studies we reviewed above suggest that surveillance is
likely to reduce the number of people willing to even consider,
much less join or convert to, a minority.2" Numerous studies show
that people in the majority generally have a personal aversion to
adopting the deviant minority identity and thus are not easily di-
rectly influenced to publicly join the minority.297 They may also
288. Maass & Clark, supra note 285, at 432 (attributing this idea to a number of Mos-
covici's works).
289. GILBERT, FISKE & LINDZEY, supra note 128, at 160.
290. Maass & Clark, supra note 285, at 430; Charlan Jeanne Nemeth & Barry M.
Staw, The Tradeoffs of Social Control and Innovation in Groups and Organizations, 22
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 175, 188 (1989) ("[Sltudies in minority influ-
ence show consistent dislike of the minority and there are anecdotal reports of threats to-
ward a minority who maintains a position even on a hypothetical issue.").
291. HAMPTON ET AL., supra note 235, at 8, 23.
292. Id. at 3.
293. Id. at 20.
294. Id. at 24-25.
295. Id. at 25.
296. See supra Part III.C; see also Maass & Clark, supra note 285, at 430.
297. Wendy Wood et al., Minority Influence: A Meta-Analytic Review of Social Influence
Processes, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 323, 323, 336 (1994) (analyzing 97 minority influence ex-
periments).
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fear losing face.298' -Thus, change caused by minority influence
usually happens privately.2 99 Minority influence happens through
"active information processing" by considering "arguments and
counterarguments."' This analytic process is likely to be im-
paired by surveillance, which may make individuals less likely to
research the minority position.
Further, a person's commitment to a minority position is di-
rectly related to her ability to resist majority influence, and sur-
veillance is likely to make it harder to become committed to a mi-
nority position."o In a variation on Asch's experiment, researchers
had subjects make a commitment to an answer by writing it
down, before all of the members of the group announced their an-
swers.302 The more committed the subject was to the answer be-
fore hearing the responses of the group, the greater her ability to
resist the group norm."' In the White and Zimbardo study on po-
lice surveillance, the surveillance had less effect on individuals
who had already taken a public position on legalization of mari-
juana.304 On the other hand, individuals who were less-decided
were most influenced by the conforming effect of the surveil-
lance.30 5
Accordingly, the conforming effect caused by surveillance can
result in smaller and less confident minorities. These minorities,
in turn, will be less successful than they otherwise might have
been at challenging the status quo and the majority views. Thus,
298. Id. at 335; see also Serge Moscovici, Innovation and Minority Influence, in
PERSPECTIVES ON MINORITY INFLUENCE 9, 9-10 (Serge Moscovici, Gabriel Mugny & Eddy
Van Avermaet eds., 1985); Serge Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity, in 2
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 347, 349 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3rd
ed. 1985).
299. Maass & Clark, supra note 285, at 444.
300. Id. (summarizing Serge Moscovici & Bernard Personnaz, Studies in Social Influ-
ence: V Minority Influence and Conversion Behavior in a Perceptual Task, 16 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 270 (1980)).
301. See Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 634 ("[Tlhe more uncertain the individ-
ual is about the correctness of his judgment, the more likely he is to be susceptible to so-
cial influences in making his judgment.").
302. Id. at 630-31.
303. Id. at 633.
304. White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 57 (some subjects had participated in groups
that advocated legalization).
305. Id.
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individuals and the public will miss out on the better, more delib-
erate, more creative, and more critical thinking that results from
minority influences.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CONFORMING EFFECT
The scope of surveillance's conforming effect is broader than ei-
ther courts or the legal literature has previously observed. This
has significant implications for the scope of First Amendment
protection, under a number of theories of the First Amendment.
In this section, we bring the social psychology research discussed
above into conversation with First Amendment theory.
First Amendment jurisprudence hints at many theories behind
doctrinal First Amendment protection. 06 The theories are so di-
verse that some suggest that First Amendment doctrine is incom-
pletely theorized."' But in areas where the scope of First
Amendment protection is uncertain, First Amendment theory can
help illuminate where doctrinal or legislative contours should be
drawn.
The two most traditional justifications for the First Amend-
ment are that: (1) it permits the search for truth through a com-
petitive marketplace of ideas; and (2) it enables democratic self-
governance.os The First Amendment enables a marketplace of
ideas because free speech allows a variety of views to compete, so
that the listener can determine which of these views rings most
true.0 9
Under the best-known competing theory, the First Amendment
exists to permit democratic self-governance."' 0 Citizens are better
at participating in political processes if they can speak freely and
debate each other. The contemporary version of the theory of
democratic self-governance requires that citizens be afforded
306. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000).
307. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 172 (1999).
308. Post, supra note 306, at 2356.
309. Id. at 2360.
310. Id. at 2356.
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speech protection beyond protecting political speech, so that citi-
zens retain the sense that their government is legitimate."'
The theory of cultural democracy extends this idea of self-
governance from government to culture.3 12 Citizens should be
permitted to participate in and thus legitimize the culture that in
turn forms them."'
A self-actualization theory of the First Amendment hypothesiz-
es that the First Amendment protects an individual's participa-
tion in culture as part of the process of self-fulfillment.314 Unlike
the theory of democratic self-governance, self-actualization focus-
es on culture, not just political participation.31 5 However, unlike
the theory of cultural democracy, self-actualization turns the
purpose of cultural consumption inwards.' The value of partici-
pation in the formation of culture is that the speaker and reader
uses culture to define herself, not that the speaker and reader
participates in defining culture at large.1 Finally, a theory close-
ly related to self-actualization is the autonomy or liberty theory of
the First Amendment, which is perhaps the most speech-
protective and permits freedom of speech, unless the state has a
legitimate reason not to permit that freedom.318
A. Legal Scholars on Privacy as a First Amendment Value
Legal scholars have employed First Amendment theory to ex-
plain why privacy in intellectual endeavors should be protected as
a First Amendment value. The two major theories behind First
Amendment protection-the search for truth and democratic self-
governance-traditionally focus on speech in public rather than
intellectual exploration in private.' However, protection for pri-
311. Id. at 2368.
312. Balkin, supra note 90, at 35.
313. Id.
314. This is also called the anti-ignorance principle. See William E. Lee, The Supreme
Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 317 (1987).
315. Balkin, supra note 90, at 3-4, 35, 46.
316. See id. at 3-4, 28-29. Contra Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409-10 (1986) (discussing self-actualization and that the intrinsic
value of speech is not a theoretical basis for First Amendment protection).
317. Balkin, supra note 90, at 34-35.
318. Lee, supra note 314, at 317-18.
319. Richards, supra note 3, at 388, 394-98.
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vate intellectual exploration allows ideas to be formed before they
go out into the marketplace, and for political ideas to be weighed
even if those ideas run counter to the majority's view. 20
Knowledge of people's reading habits prevents the emergence of
minority ideas."' It also gives the government a way to silence
dissent before it comes into the marketplace or becomes part of
the self-governance debate.322 Freedom of private inquiry makes
perfect sense under the autonomy or liberty theory of the First
Amendment, because individuals should be supported in their
development and self-fulfillment.32 3 Thus, legal scholars have rea-
soned that a number of theories of the First Amendment support
protection of intellectual privacy as a First Amendment value.
B. What Social Science Adds
Social science evidence of the conforming effect of surveillance
gives even greater credence to the protection of reader and viewer
privacy as a First Amendment matter. As observed, surveillance
tends to more strongly influence those who are undecided in their
beliefs. 24 It can make it more difficult for people to think critical-
ly." It can encourage people to change their underlying beliefs to
resolve cognitive dissonance.' It can also discourage the flourish-
ing of minority views.327 These features have implications under
multiple theories of the First Amendment.
The conforming effect suggests that we should protect an unde-
cided person's freedom to explore new ideas. If we wish to develop
the next generation of advocates who, bolstered by research and
reading, will be able resist society's conforming effect, we need to
protect those advocates most when they are in the fragile, unde-
cided stage during which they are more easily influenced.
320. See Blitz, supra note 3, at 802-03; Richards, supra note 3, at 389.
321. See Blitz, supra note 3, at 830; Richards, supra note 3, at 388-89.
322. Richards, supra note 3, at 406.
323. Blitz, supra note 3, at 830-31; Richards, supra note 3, at 406-07.
324. See Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 634.
325. See id. at 635.
326. Id.
327. Richards, supra note 3, at 419, 425.
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1. Marketplace of Ideas
The search-for-truth theory of the First Amendment suggests
that ideas compete with each other in an open marketplace until
truth eventually emerges.328 For the marketplace of ideas to work,
ideas must be produced.
Anxiety spurred by surveillance may prevent, or at the very
least impede, the formation of new rational ideas.329 This leads to
fewer ideas in the marketplace. And if undecided people are not
afforded adequate privacy, they will not engage in the search for
truth."o Instead, the undecided will side with the majority, and
society will suffer for having fewer participants in feeding and be-
ing fed from the marketplace of ideas.' Surveillance of private
inquiry may affect those who already hold minority viewpoints, as
well. Through a desire to publicly conform, they may chose not to
express their conflicting views, and through cognitive dissonance,
they may gradually be led to believe the majority viewpoint.
2. Democratic Self-Governance
The theory of democratic self-governance encourages speech for
the purposes of enabling an effective political process.3 3 2 Surveil-
lance causes anxiety that may inhibit rational thought, and pre-
vent the surveilled from rationally participating in a self-
governance debate. Moreover, the governed may come to resent a
government that places them in a state of anxiety and unrest,
and may ultimately withdraw from participation in the political
system. Those who do not hold strong political viewpoints may
conform to the majority view without knowing that they are con-
forming, making political change less likely. For those who hold
minority viewpoints, the cognitive dissonance created by publicly
conforming while privately disagreeing may cause them to change
their beliefs irrationally, rather than rationally self-govern.
328. Post, supra note 306, at 2363.
329. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text. See generally Darhl M. Pedersen,
Psychological Functions of Privacy, 17 J. ENvTL. PSYCHOL. 147 (1997) (discussing the im-
portance of privacy to personal autonomy).
330. See Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 635.
331. Id.
332. Post, supra note 306, at 2366-67.
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Minority influence is essential to a democracy because that is
what enables change and innovation, and spurs critical think-
ing." A minority begins with one person understanding the world
in a different way. Slowly, that individual meets other like-
minded individuals, and occasionally, the minority becomes a ma-
jority. Without independent judgments that challenge the majori-
ty, the majority consensus is likely to be empty and will under-
mine "creativity and productiveness."3 34 As one leading researcher
concluded, minority influences "provide the impetus for detecting
truths primarily because they stimulate thought."" "From this
perspective, robust dissent is not only a manifestation of a demo-
cratic principle, but it is the mechanism by which better solutions
are found and better decisions are made.""
3. Cultural Democracy
The First Amendment theory of cultural democracy suggests
that people should be permitted to democratically help form the
culture of which they are a part.3 Surveillance prevents this
from happening because the surveilled become more anxious, and
thus less imaginative. The surveillance subject is less likely to
participate in cultural play because of pressures for conformity
and cognitive dissonance between the person they present to the
public and the person they want to be. 3
4. Self-Actualization and Autonomy
Finally, the self-actualization and closely related autonomy
theories of the First Amendment are perhaps most affected by so-
cial science research on the effects of surveillance. This research
suggests that surveillance both prevents its subjects from self-
fulfillment through enjoying life undisturbed and nudges its sub-
jects away from being their rational liberal selves.' Even if one
333. WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT, supra note 222, at v-vi, 1.
334. Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 128, at 635.
335. Nemeth, supra note 127, at 30.
336. Id. at 30-31.
337. Balkin, supra note 90, at 3.
338. See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012) (dis-
cussing the centrality of privacy for identity play).
339. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 3, at 403; White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 59-
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believes that there is no such thing as a rational liberal self, the
autonomy theory can hold some appeal because it requires that
the government leave a person well-enough alone. Surveillance,
as the research summarized here suggests, does not leave well-
enough alone. It fundamentally affects the development of the in-
dividual self.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Reviewing First Amendment theory in light of the conforming
effect of surveillance suggests that the government should do
more to protect citizen privacy in intellectual inquiries. This arti-
cle closes with several practical recommendations on how recogni-
tion of the conforming effect should affect the development of both
jurisprudence and legislation.
A. Courts
While a number of scholars have correctly identified that the
protection of reader and viewer privacy is unlikely to ever be en-
tirely protected by the courts, this article maintains that the sig-
nificant doctrinal questions identified in Part II can be informed
by a more accurate understanding of the conforming effect.
As discussed in Part II, courts have evinced skepticism about
privacy harms, and some have refused to recognize a First
Amendment privacy claim without a showing of likely retalia-
tion.340 Courts should recognize that the conforming effect exists
even without a threat of retaliation against individual speakers
or viewpoints. This does not mean that courts must recognize a
harm when plaintiffs fail to assert one; courts can, however, be
more sympathetic to plaintiffs who show a concrete reaction to
surveillance without requiring a showing of likely retaliation
from third parties. Courts could instead recognize harm, such as
lawyers not being able to talk to clients and nonprofits experienc-
ing a drop-off in phone calls and emails. Similarly, the holding in
Laird v. Tatum that surveillance alone is not an adequate
60.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 91-113.
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harm to confer standing should be viewed with skepticism in light
of the existence of the conforming effect.'
Courts might also use support for the conforming effect to ex-
tend First Amendment privacy protection beyond affirmative re-
quirements that individuals identify themselves. The existence of
the conforming effect shows that surveillance can have First
Amendment implications even if people are not affirmatively re-
quired to identify themselves by name.
B. Legislatures
As other scholars have identified, reader and viewer privacy is
a First Amendment value that requires protection beyond what
courts will afford-particularly with respect to surveillance by
private actors."' Although more research will help inform the de-
bate, the conforming effect suggests that the costs of surveillance
are higher than previously understood and their consequences
more far-reaching. Because individuals may not even be aware
that they are affected, and because courts are reluctant to grant
relief without clear evidence of harm, legislatures should act to
protect First Amendment privacy.
This is a space in which legislatures have acted before. In re-
sponse to the FBI's Library Awareness Program from the 1970s,
nearly every state passed some sort of library record confidential-
ity statute.343 In 2013, Arizona explicitly added e-book protection
to their library records statute.344 California's reader privacy stat-
ute extends to digital privacy.345 At the federal level, the VPPA
and the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 both provide
some protection for people consuming media."'
341. 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
342. See, e.g., Ard, supra note 2, at 3, 38; Andrew A. Proia, A New Approach to Digital
Reader Privacy: State Regulations and Their Protection of Digital Book Data, 88 IND. L.J.
1593, 1608-10, 1613 (2013); Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J.
689, 718-19 (2013).
343. See State Privacy Laws Regarding Library Records, AM. LIBRARY Assoc., http://
www.ala.org/advocacy/privacyconfidentiality/privacy/stateprivacy (last visited Nov. 25,
2014).
344. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-151.22 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation).
345. See California Reader Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90 (Deering, LEXIS
through 2013 legislation).
346. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2012); 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)-(c) (2012).
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These laws may be a good starting place, but they are inade-
quate given the variety of ways in which people acquire infor-
mation online, the large number of third parties involved in such
transactions, and the evident scope of NSA data collection. Sever-
al scholars have examined the contours of these laws, including:
whether they should target particular institutions (such as librar-
ies);347 whether they should target the type of information (such as
reader records);"' and proposing that online sharing should be no
easier than performing the action being shared.34 9
We advocate closer examination into what causes the conform-
ing effect, and encourage attempts to craft legislation to protect
privacy accordingly. Movements away from protecting intellectual
privacy, such as the revision of the VPPA, should be examined for
their potential effect on user behavior-have users in fact become
more conservative in their viewing habits since the revision of the
VPPA? Were social network users more conformist in their listen-
ing and reading habits during the heyday of frictionless sharing?
To date, the most prominent research and public concern over
surveillance has been related to people like journalists and law-
yers who are aware that their speech is being chilled.5 o The social
science research strongly suggests that legislatures should also
take into account the real possibility that surveillance is having a
small but widespread influence on the population as a whole,
likely making them less open to new ideas, more anxious, less
creative, and generally more conservative. These ideas should, of
course, be tested by further research, but the idea that surveil-
lance alone may be making the entire country more conservative
is distressing.
Legislatures can do two things to help remedy this problem.
First, they can pass laws reducing the amount of surveillance
that the government may conduct. Obviously this requires bal-
ancing the consequences of conforming effects with security, but
legislation should be written with the potential consequences to
society as a whole in mind. Legislatures should also take into ac-
347. See Blitz, supra note 3, at 834.
348. See Ard, supra note 2, at 32-37.
349. See McGeveran, supra note 72, at 64-65.
350. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL: How LARGE-
SCALE, U.S. SURVEILLANCE Is HARMING JOURNALISM, LAW AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(July 2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usnsaO 7l 4 ForUPloadO.pdf.
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count the consequences of surveillance by third parties such as
Internet service providers, Google, Amazon, and other web com-
panies. Second, legislatures in general and Congress in particular
can take an active role in forcing law enforcement and the mili-
tary to clearly disclose the scope of their surveillance programs.
Currently, the public has little knowledge of the scope of the pro-
grams and thus assumes the worst. 5
C. Further Research
Further empirical research will continue to help inform this
debate. Researchers should help explore the extent of the conse-
quences of widespread surveillance in a number of critical areas.
First, the legal community and society at-large need a more
complete understanding of the types of surveillance and surveil-
lance cues that cause chilling effects. For example, in the White
and Zimbardo study, the subjects were staring into a camera,
making them very aware of the surveillance.' 2 What effects are
caused by surveillance cameras, articles on surveillance, or other
cues that surveillance is occurring? Are people more affected by
knowing that they are surveilled, or by fearing the worst?15" Se-
cond, further study into the effects of surveillance and the
strength of its effects is needed. For example, does surveillance
make people more conservative, and, if so, by how much? Third,
an understanding as to the duration of the conforming effect is
essential-will someone who reads an article about NSA surveil-
lance be affected for the following fifteen minutes or the following
year?.5 . These are not the only issues that need to be studied, but
they provide a starting point that will greatly contribute to this
discussion and to any attempts at drafting legislation.
351. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
352. White & Zimbardo, supra note 1, at 51, 53-54.
353. Calo has discussed this with respect to notice skepticism-skepticism about the
effects of providing notice that one is being watched. There needs to be further research
into whether notice changes behavior towards conformity, or just alters behavior in gen-
eral. See Calo, supra note 162, at 1029-30.
354. Some research suggests that the effect of an image of a pair of eyes is fleeting, but
also suggested that this may be because an image does not imply there actually is surveil-
lance. See Sparks & Barclay, supra note 169, at 318, 321. Future research would need to
explore these differences.
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CONCLUSION
A 2013 study found that about half of Internet users are wor-
ried about the information that is available about their online be-
havior.' That number was up from one-third of Internet users in
2009." Another study, from 2007, found that about 28% of Amer-
icans reported being somewhat or very anxious about government
monitoring.17 The researchers suggested that anxiety about gov-
ernment monitoring could influence participation in politics, po-
litical criticism, and voter decision-making."
We live in an era in which fears of surveillance may be as om-
nipresent as surveillance itself. It is crucial that we understand
the effects of surveillance on the principles our democracy holds
dear. This article is a step in that direction, arguing that social
science research has shown that surveillance has a substantial
conforming effect on people's behavior. For those concerned about
the principles behind First Amendment protection, the conform-
ing effect should be as worrisome as the much-touted chilling ef-
fect.
The worst enemy of free speech is not always fear. Sometimes
it is the desire to keep friends, to avoid irritating family mem-
bers, or just to remain unnoticed. Living in a surveillance society
may have effects on the development of new ideas and underlying
beliefs that we have only begun to understand. If our government
is to continue to engage in dragnet practices, it must do the re-
search to understand their effects.
355. Rainie et al., supra note 42, at 2.
356. Id.
357. Best, Krueger & Pearson-Merkowitz, supra note 248, at 618.
358. Id. at 620.
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